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Abstract
Agri-environmental policy is at a crossroads. Over the past 20 years, a wide range
of policies addressing the environmental implications of agricultural production
have been implemented at the Federal level. Those policies have played an impor-
tant role in reducing soil erosion, protecting and restoring wetlands, and creating
wildlife habitat. However, emerging agri-environmental issues, evolution of farm
income support policies, and limits imposed by trade agreements may point toward
a rethinking of agri-environmental policy. This report identifies the types of policy
tools available and the design features that have improved the effectiveness of cur-
rent programs. It provides an indepth analysis of one policy tool that may be an
important component of a future policy package—agri-environmental payments.
The analysis focuses on issues and tradeoffs that policymakers would face in
designing a program of agri-environmental payments.
Keywords: conservation programs, environmental policy, agricultural policy,
policy instruments, agricultural program design, soil erosion, and nitrogen runoff
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Summary
In the upcoming farm bill debate, decisionmakers considering policies that address
the environmental implications of agricultural production may find themselves at a
crossroads. Significant progress has been made in addressing traditional environ-
mental concerns over the past 15 years; soil erosion is down, wetland restoration
and protection have increased, and more wildlife habitat exists on farmlands. But
the array of policy-relevant agri-environmental problems has also grown, as farm
practices have changed and public concern has increased. In addition, world trade
agreements may limit farm program options, perhaps increasing the practicality of
“green-box” agri-environmental programs as vehicles for income support. This
changing landscape presents decisionmakers with tremendous challenges as well
as new opportunities.
This report provides policymakers with a guide to some of the choices they may
face in formulating new agri-environmental policies. This guide looks back at past
policies and the lessons that can be gleaned from their implementation, and it
looks forward at the range of options available, providing conceptual insights and
estimates of future policy tradeoffs. The potential benefits and costs of each policy
option depend on the specifics of the program’s design, so significant detail on
design features is provided. 
A glimpse into the policy toolbox reveals a wide variety of policy options: infor-
mation dissemination programs such as education and technical assistance, govern-
ment labeling standards, economic incentives, compliance mechanisms, and regu-
latory requirements. These tools range from voluntary to mandatory. Some are bet-
ter suited for addressing problems or creating benefits flowing from the amount of
land in crop production, while others are best suited for addressing issues arising
from the choice of which crops to produce and how to produce them. The role of
government varies as well. Government participation may be indirect or direct; for
example, government agents may make information available to farmers or they
might disburse (or collect) payments to (from) farmers. This variation in features
among policy tools implies potential variation in the environmental effectiveness,
economic efficiency, and distributional consequences of each. Tradeoffs—among
environmental goals and in who gains and who loses and where in the country
those gains and losses occur—are inherent in any policy choice.
Experiences with past agri-environmental programs provide lessons on effective
design options.
 Environmental targeting channels funding to those areas where the environ-
mental benefits are greatest relative to costs. Targeting can, however, result in
an uneven distribution of program funding. One approach to environmental tar-
geting—the Environmental Benefits Index—has been successfully applied in
the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP).
 Producer flexibility allows farmers to devise a least-cost approach to meeting
environmental improvements rather than imposing a specific approach devised
at county, State, or Federal offices. This flexibility has been successfully
applied in implementation of conservation compliance provisions. 
 Program coordination ensures that programs do not duplicate or offset each
other. Coordination is complicated because of the wide range of existing farmiv  Agri-Environmental Policy at the Crossroads / AER-794 Economic Research Service/USDA
programs and environmental regulations. Implementation of conservation com-
pliance provisions with the 1985 farm bill demonstrated successful coordination. 
Maintaining the environmental gains achieved to date and addressing an expanded
range of problems (nitrate leaching, manure management, etc.) in an increasingly
complex policy landscape may require a mix of policy tools, some relatively new.
One such tool is an agri-environmental payments program—payments to farmers
who use or adopt practices that enhance the environment. While agri-environmen-
tal payments have tremendous potential to meet multiple environmental and farm
income goals, how well they perform will depend on numerous design decisions,
such as:
 The objective of the program—which environmental goal(s) is the program
designed to achieve? Is support of farm income a program goal? 
 The program base—what actions will trigger payments? Will we pay only for
improvements in environmental quality, or will payments be made to all “good
actors?” Will payments be based on the use or adoption of specific manage-
ment practices thought to improve the environment, or will they be based on a
measure of whether environmental quality actually improves? Will constraints
be imposed on which lands are eligible for payments?
 The payment rate—How much will farmers be paid? Will payments exceed
farmers’ costs? Will payments be targeted, that is, will they vary spatially with
the level of potential benefits from improving environmental quality? Will total
program size be limited?
An agricultural sector simulation model measures many of the tradeoffs inherent in
selecting among environmental goals or across program design features. Because
not all market and nonmarket impacts are measured, results are instructive but not
definitive. The environmental quality measures featured in the analysis are benefits
from reduced soil erosion and nitrogen runoff. Soil erosion, at 1.9 billion tons per
year, remains significant even though farm programs and changes in farming prac-
tices have reduced erosion 40 percent between 1982 and 1997. Nitrogen’s adverse
impact on water quality in coastal areas is a significant and growing concern.
Nitrogen loadings (from fertilizer) are a leading cause of eutrophication in coastal
estuaries and a large hypoxic zone in the Gulf of Mexico, though the full scope of
these problems is still unknown.
Given the multiple objectives of agricultural policy, the analysis suggests that some
tradeoffs can be avoided by addressing each objective separately. Objectives may
be complementary or conflicting, but even where overlap exists, the ability to
achieve two or more goals with a single instrument may be limited. For example, a
program targeted to reduce nitrogen runoff damage could increase soil erosion
damage. However, reductions in soil erosion may reduce damages from phospho-
rus. In other examples, the analysis shows that targeting payments to support the
incomes of any specific group of farmers is unlikely to solve any given agri-envi-
ronmental problem. Conversely, targeting any specific agri-environmental problem
may exclude many producers that policymakers would otherwise include in an
income support program. 
Simulation results indicate that subsidizing only environmental improvement (if
such a program can be implemented) would be the most cost-effective way to
achieve environmental gains. However, environmental improvement implies thatEconomic Research Service/USDA Agri-Environmental Policy at the Crossroads / AER-794  v
payments would apply only for changes in environmental performance made after
enactment of an agri-environmental payment program. Lack of a pre-program,
farm-specific environmental baseline may prevent policymakers from implement-
ing such a program. Moreover, payments based on environmental improvement
would not recognize the past contribution of “good actors”—producers who have
already achieved a high level of environmental performance. 
Alternatives include payments based on “good” environmental performance (e.g.,
“low” rates of soil erosion as estimated by the Universal Soil Loss Equation) or the
use of environmentally “good” practices (e.g., conservation tillage), regardless of
when or why “good” performance was achieved or “good” practices were adopted.
These approaches are practical and equitable to good actors. However, they are
likely to be less cost effective in achieving environmental gains and, unless care-
fully crafted, may create an incentive to expand production onto previously
uncropped land. This could lead to a worsening of environmental quality. 
Payments for “good” environmental performance would focus on management or
conservation practices that are environmentally effective. When there is more than
one way to achieve an environmental gain, a performance-based payment would
allow producers to select the lowest cost alternative for their own resource condi-
tions and farming operation. However, performance-based payments may entail
substantial public investment in planning and enforcement. Farm- or field-specific
conservation plans would be required.
Payments for “good” practices would limit producer flexibility and may result in
the use of practices that are ineffective under some resource conditions. However,
planning and enforcement costs may be quite low. Thus, practice-based payments
may be more or less cost effective than performance-based payments depending on
the environmental problem to be addressed and the resource conditions, crops, and
farming practices at hand. 
Agri-environmental issues come in all shapes and sizes and a one-size-fits-all pol-
icy tool does not exist. Hence, harmonizing agricultural production with prefer-
ences for improved environmental quality may require a menu of policy options.
But choosing one, or many, policy tools is just the beginning. How well a policy
instrument performs and the distribution of benefits and costs—among and
between farmers, consumers, and taxpayers—will depend as much on how a policy
is designed as on which policy is selected. Economic Research Service/USDA Agri-Environmental Policy at the Crossroads / AER-794  1
Introduction
Agricultural production can both enhance the environ-
ment and degrade it. Agriculture provides rural land-
scape amenities and wildlife habitat, but has also
resulted in soil erosion, nutrient and pesticide runoff,
and the loss of wetlands (see box “Environmental
Impacts of Agriculture”). Agricultural producers have
limited market incentives to maintain beneficial prac-
tices or reduce environmental damages. Environmental
outcomes typically follow from production on many
farms over a large area. Benefits and damages often
occur at some distance (i.e., downstream or down-
wind) from the farms that create them and may be
realized only after a period of months or even years.
The contributions of an individual farmer to environ-
mental benefits and damages are neither directly
observable nor easily monitored.
Agri-environmental programs seek to increase environ-
mental benefits and decrease environmental damages
associated with agricultural production. For example,
soil conservation can reduce sediment in water,
enhancing water-based recreations such as boating.
Land retirement or wetland restoration can provide
habitat that increases wildlife populations, enhancing
wildlife viewing, fishing, and hunting. Agri-environ-
mental programs may also support farm income. For
example, a subsidy program might pay farmers who
use environmentally sound production practices such
as conservation tillage or nutrient management. These
payments, even if designed to improve environmental
quality, could provide another source of farm income. 
Agri-environmental policy generally refers to a group
of programs that encourage farmers to adopt environ-
mentally sound production practices. Policy instru-
ments or “tools” range from involuntary approaches,
such as regulation or environmental taxes, to volun-
tary approaches such as technical assistance and sub-
sidy programs. Some programs—like land retire-
ment—discourage the use of environmentally sensi-
tive land in crop production. Other programs focus on
crop production practices (which tillage systems or
chemicals are used) or on livestock waste manage-
ment. Education and technical assistance help produc-
ers improve environmental performance, with or with-
out financial incentives.
Producer participation in agri-environmental programs
has mostly been voluntary; participants receive cost-
share or incentive payments. To be eligible for these
and other farm program payments, however, producers
must meet minimum standards of soil conservation on
highly erodible land and refrain from converting wet-
lands for crop production. 
How well an agri-environmental policy instrument per-
forms (e.g., the extent of environmental gains, cost of
achieving gains, and distribution of these costs)
depends largely on program design and implementa-
tion. In other words, the “devil is in the detail.” Perfor-
mance can vary widely depending on how a policy
tool is used as well as which policy tool is used. Pro-
gram features that can improve the effectiveness of an
agri-environmental policy instrument, recognizing




Changes in the slate of agri-environmental problems
and changes in agricultural and trade policy have
transformed the agri-environmental policy landscape
over the last two decades. A number of factors may
point toward a rethinking and restructuring of agri-
environmental policy. 
First, the number of widely recognized agri-environ-
mental problems is expanding. Before 1990, agri-envi-
ronmental policy focused largely on conserving soil to
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Seventy-one percent of all U.S. cropland (nearly 300 mil-
lion acres) is located in watersheds where the concentra-
tion of either dissolved nitrate, phosphorus, fecal col-
iform bacteria, or suspended sediment exceeds criteria for
supporting water-based recreation (Smith et al., 1994). 
National water quality assessments strongly suggest that
agriculture is a leading source of remaining water qual-
ity problems (Ribaudo and Smith, 2000). Sediment is
the largest contaminant of surface water by weight and
volume (Koltun et al., 1997), and is identified by States
as the leading pollution problem in rivers and streams
(U.S. EPA, 1998). High concentrations of nitrogen in
agricultural streams were correlated with nitrogen
inputs from fertilizers and manure used for crops and
from livestock wastes (USGS, 1999). 
The level of agricultural nitrogen use, as with nitrogen
concentrations in surface waters, rose sharply during the
1970’s, peaked in 1981, and then stabilized (Smith et al.,
1993; Smith et al., 1987). 
Eutrophication and hypoxia in the northern Gulf of
Mexico are due to nitrogen loadings from the Missis-
sippi River (Rabalais et al., 1997). Agricultural sources
(fertilizer, soil inorganic nitrogen pool, and manure) are
estimated to contribute about 65 percent of the nitrogen
loads entering the gulf from the Mississippi Basin
(Goolsby et al., 1999). As much as 15 percent of the
nitrogen fertilizer and up to 3 percent of pesticides
applied to cropland in the Mississippi River Basin
make their way to the Gulf of Mexico (Goolsby and
Battaglin, 1993). 
Recent research found that 44 estuaries (40 percent of
major U.S. estuaries) exhibited highly eutrophic condi-
tions, caused by nutrient enrichment (Bricker et al.,
1999). These conditions occurred in estuaries along all
coasts, but are most prevalent in estuaries along the
Gulf of Mexico and Middle Atlantic coasts.
The most frequently detected herbicides in surface
waters include several triazines (atrazine, cyanazine,
and simazine), acetanilides (metolachlor and alachlor),
and 2,4-D. These are among the most commonly used
agricultural herbicides (USGS, 1999).
At least one of seven important herbicides (atrazine,
cyanazine, simazine, alachlor, metolachlor, prometon,
and acetochlor) was found in 37 percent of the ground-
water sites examined by USGS but all at low concentra-
tions (Barbash et al., 1999).
From its 1988-90 survey of drinking water wells, the
EPA found nitrate in more than half of the 94,600
community water system wells and in almost 60 per-
cent of the 10.5 million rural domestic wells. Levels
exceeded minimum recommendations in 1.2 percent
and 2.4 percent of the community and rural wells
(U.S. EPA, 1992). 
Groundwater levels are declining anywhere from 6
inches to 5 feet annually beneath more than 14 million
acres of irrigated land (Sloggett and Dickason, 1986).
Groundwater overdrafts tend to permanently increase
pumping costs; can lead to land subsidence, which com-
pacts the aquifer’s structure; and can induce saltwater
intrusion (USDA/ERS, 1997a).
Soil particulate, farm chemicals, and odor from live-
stock are carried in the air we breathe. 
Habitat loss associated with modern farming methods
on over 400 million acres of cropland brought about
dramatic reductions in many wildlife species in North
America, including cottontail rabbits and ringneck
pheasants (Wildlife Management Institute, 1995; Risley
et al., 1995).
Agriculture has been a factor in the decline of 380 of
the 663 species federally listed as threatened or endan-
gered in the United States (USDA/ERS, 1997a).
Agricultural wetland conversions averaged 31,000 acres
per year between 1982 and 1992 (Heimlich et al.,
1998). Wetland losses often reduce biodiversity because
many organisms depend on wetlands and riparian zones
for feeding, breeding, and shelter (NRC, 1995). 
Environmental Impacts of AgricultureEconomic Research Service/USDA Agri-Environmental Policy at the Crossroads / AER-794  3
preserve agricultural productivity. The 1990 farm bill
expanded agri-environmental objectives to include
water quality, air quality (dust), and wildlife habitat.
More recently, nutrient runoff from agricultural
sources has been identified as a key source of remain-
ing U.S. surface water quality problems (USEPA and
USDA, 1998). Nutrient runoff from commercial fertil-
izer, animal waste, and non-farm sources is polluting
estuaries throughout the United States (Bricker et al.,
1999). Nutrient inflows into the Gulf of Mexico are
the suspected cause of a large zone of hypoxic (oxy-
gen-depleted) waters (Goolsby, 1999), creating a “dead
zone” largely devoid of marine life. Nutrient runoff
from livestock farms may be responsible for outbreaks
of waterborne pathogens, including pfiesteria piscicida
(Mlot, 1997), Cryptosporidium (USDA, NRCS,
2000a), and deadly strains of E. coli (USDA, NRCS,
2000b). Other emerging or ongoing issues include the
use of genetically engineered organisms in agricultural
production, carbon emissions and the potential for
sequestration in agriculture, and food safety concerns
ranging from pesticide residues to new strains of
antibiotic-resistant bacteria.
Second, environmental issues are increasingly impor-
tant in agricultural policy. While farm income support
has always been an implicit objective of agri-environ-
mental programs (Luzar, 1988; Reichelderfer, 1991;
Batie, 1984), environmental performance is now
explicitly recognized as a policy objective in farm
income support programs. Coordination between
income support and agri-environmental policy was
increased significantly in the 1985 and 1990 farm bills,
helping to create significant agri-environmental gains.
Since 1985, eligibility for farm income support pro-
grams has been tied to soil conservation on highly
erodible land and preservation of wetlands. Between
1982 and 1997, soil erosion was reduced by nearly 40
percent on U.S. cropland.1 The rate of wetland conver-
sion for crop production in 1982-92 was a fraction of
that in the 1950’s and 1960’s (Heimlich and Melanson,
1995; Frayer et al., 1983). Policy coordination may
have played an important role in slowing wetland con-
1 Source is 1997 National Resources Inventory, U.S. Department
of Agriculture, Natural Resources Conservation Service:
www.nhq.nrcs.usda.gov/NRI/1997/.
Agriculture-induced erosion fell from 3.08 to 1.89 billion
tons/year from 1982 to 1997.1
Nonmarket benefits of erosion reduction due to compliance
are estimated to exceed $1.4 billion/year (Hyberg, 1997). 
Nonmarket benefits of erosion reduction due to the CRP
land-use changes are estimated to exceed $692
million/year (see table 3).
Wetland losses fell from 593,000 acres/year in 1954-74
(Frayer et al., 1983) to 31,000 acres/year in 1982-92
(Heimlich and Melanson, 1995) as conversions became
less cost-effective and Federal regulations became 
more constraining.
Swampbuster now discourages conversion of 1.5 to 3.3
million (estimated range) wetland acres (Claassen et 
al., 2000).
The WRP and EWRP have restored over 990,000 acres
of wetlands (Heimlich et al., 1998; USDA, NRCS,
2000c).
The permanent cover of the CRP and WRP has improved
wildlife habitat. The nonmarket benefits from the habitat
provided by the CRP are estimated at over $704 mil-
lion/year (see table 3).
Conservation tillage, which reduces soil erosion, was
used on over 37 percent of all acres planted in 1998, up
from 26 percent in 1989 (Magleby et al., 2000).
Land in retirement programs is increasing the amount of
carbon sequestered in the soil, mitigating greenhouse gas
buildup. A CRP acre in the Great Plains is estimated to
sink approximately 0.85 metric ton of carbon each year
(Lewandrowski et al., 2000).
Success of Agri-Environmental Protection, 1985-2000
1Estimates of changes in erosion from 1982 to 1997 are from
ERS analysis of National Resources Inventory (NRI) data of
the USDA/NRCS.4  Agri-Environmental Policy at the Crossroads / AER-794 Economic Research Service/USDA
version for agricultural production (Heimlich et al.,
1998). Land retirement and other traditional agri-envi-
ronmental policies, which focused largely on soil con-
servation before 1990, have been broadened to include
water quality, air quality, and wildlife habitat. 
Third, recent developments indicate that the future of
farm price and income support policy is uncertain
(Browne et al., 1997; Orden et al., 1996). In some
respects, the 1996 FAIR Act was designed to reduce
the role of the Federal Government in agriculture.
Some farm income support was decoupled from mar-
ket prices and production decisions. Annual acreage
reduction programs, designed to reduce commodity
production in times of excess supply, were ended
(Young and Westcott, 1996). On the other hand, loan
deficiency payments (LDP’s), which have accounted
for a significant share of income support in recent
years, are closely tied to production and market prices.
Moreover, in 1998 and 1999, policymakers approved
emergency farm legislation to partially offset low mar-
ket prices and other disasters and up total direct pro-
ducer payments to $14.4 billion in 1999 and $20.8 bil-
lion in 2000.2 This strongly affirms Congress’ commit-
ment to farm income support, but the cost and ad hoc
nature of emergency legislation also raises questions
about the underlying rationale for farm support and the
sustainability of current farm programs. 
Moreover, global trade agreements have further com-
plicated the farm policy debate, possibly restricting
farm program options. Under the Uruguay Round
Agreement on Agriculture, countries agreed to reduce
domestic commodity price support and export subsi-
dies. The United States met its commitment to limit
farm commodity support to no more than $23.1 billion
in 1995, and is to meet a ceiling of $19.1 billion3 in
2000 (USDA, ERS, 1997b). Many U.S. programs—
including “decoupled” payments, the Conservation
Reserve Program (CRP), and the Environmental Qual-
ity Incentives Program (EQIP)—appear to qualify as
“green box” programs that do not count against sup-
port ceilings. (USDA/ERS, 1998a and 1998b). How-
ever, countercyclical payment mechanisms (such as
loan deficiency payments under the 1996 Act and defi-
ciency payments under past farm bills) would count
against support payment ceilings.
These changes hint at new roles for agri-environmental
programs in the tableau of U.S. agricultural policy.
Some have suggested that the limits imposed by trade
agreements will give greater prominence to “green
box” agri-environmental programs as vehicles for farm
income support. Others see a need to replace conserva-
tion compliance—the quid pro quo arrangement under
which commodity and commodity loan payment recip-
ients must provide minimum land stewardship—with
programs that independently encourage good practices
(or discourage bad ones). Questionable environmental
implications of subsidized crop insurance—an increas-
ingly popular farm program mechanism suspected of
inducing farmers to overplant—are leading some to
look for new agri-environmental program resolutions
to the ever-present problem of program consistency
across agricultural objectives. And producers who face
the prospect of increasing regulation, particularly of
animal waste management for water quality, seek a
lower-cost, voluntary alternative through new or
expanded agri-environmental program opportunities.
A new farm bill will be debated in 2001 and 2002
(which also ends the period of payments under the 1996
FAIR Act). This presents a grand opportunity to rethink
the focus of agri-environmental policy and its relation-
ship to overall farm policy. In looking ahead, only one
thing is certain. Agricultural policymakers in the legisla-
tive and executive branches, and their constituents in
agricultural and environmental interest arenas, will wit-
ness adoption of some portfolio of policies that will
influence (if not induce) particular levels of agri-envi-
ronmental protection and farm and farm household
income. Exactly what those levels are, and how they
relate to one another, is a direct function of the specific
features—bells, whistles, and more pedestrian details—
of the agri-environmental programs in place at the time.
Because the features of agri-environmental programs
end up resonating in the political arena, a prospective
examination of how outcomes appear to be linked with
program characteristics is clearly a useful exercise. And
because history informs the future, some retrospective
reflection can be equally useful.
This report seeks to arm those considering the future
of agri-environmental programs with lessons gleaned
from the past and conceptual insights about future
2 Program payments include: Production Flexibility Contracts, Loan
Deficiency Payments, Market Loss Assistance Payments, Noninsured
Assistance Payments, Disaster Assistance, Cotton User Market Pay-
ments, Supplementary Income Assistance Payments, Farm Storage
Facility Loans, and other direct payments. Dollar figures are based on
data from Office of Budget and Program Analysis, USDA.
3 Not all of the direct payments to farmers mentioned above are sub-
ject to limitations, so the support ceiling is unlikely to be violated.Economic Research Service/USDA Agri-Environmental Policy at the Crossroads / AER-794  5
farm and agri-environmental policy interactions. We
begin with a review of the general types of policy
“tools” available and utilized to gain agri-environmen-
tal benefits. We then catalog the environmental gains
achieved and limitations encountered under the poli-
cies and programs in place between 1985 and 2000.
From this, we extract a series of lessons about the
design of cost-effective conservation and agri-environ-
mental policies.
Finally, we turn to analysis of a specific agri-environ-
mental policy option: an agri-environmental payments
program. Agri-environmental payments are based on
actions taken to improve environmental performance.
As we use the term, agri-environmental payments are
extended to producers primarily for changes in farm-
ing practices and are designed to address issues that
may not be effectively addressed with more traditional
cost-share or land retirement programs. For example,
changes in crop rotations, input use, and tillage sys-
tems could be subsidized under an agri-environmental
payments program. Although not principally a land
retirement program, producers could retire land in
response to an agri-environmental payments program
as a method of reducing input use, soil erosion, etc. 
Green payments are frequently discussed as an alterna-
tive for, or supplement to, current farm income and
environmental programs (Lynch, 1994; Lynch and
Smith, 1994; Batie, 1999; Horan, 1999; Claassen and
Horan, 2000). For example, the Conservation Security
Program (CSP), proposed as part of the Clinton
Administration’s FY 2001 budget proposal, would pro-
vide payments to support farm income but only to
farmers who implement or maintain certain conserva-
tion practices such as conservation tillage or nutrient
management (Glickman, 2000).
We address a number of questions that policymakers
will face in designing any agri-environmental pay-
ments program:
 How will producers be prioritized for the receipt of
payments? On the basis of potential environmental
gain, need of farm income support, or both?
 Will payments be based on a measure or estimate of
environmental performance or on the use of prac-
tices deemed to be environmentally sound?
 Will “good actors”—producers who have already
adopted good conservation practices and/or achieved
good environmental performance—receive pay-
ments on the basis of past actions? 
 Will payments exceed the cost of making changes
required for program participation? In other words,
will producers derive significant benefits—over and
above their costs—from participation in an agri-
environmental program? 
These program design details will largely determine
the environmental and farm income effects of an agri-
environmental payment program. To illustrate this, we
define some hypothetical program scenarios. Using a
computer simulation model designed to predict pro-
ducer response to policy incentives, we analyze these
scenarios to illustrate some of the more important
tradeoffs policymakers will face in designing an agri-
environmental payment program.
In analyzing program options, we pay special attention
to the prospects for unintended consequences that may
arise from extensive use of a subsidy mechanism. 
The term “green payment” refers to a
subset of agri-environmental payment
programs that have both environmental
and farm income objectives.  6  Agri-Environmental Policy at the Crossroads / AER-794 Economic Research Service/USDA
Various Policy Instruments 
For Various Ends
Agricultural production affects the environment in
myriad ways, and so begets multiple policy instru-
ments to mitigate those effects. This section provides
an overview of policy instrument types, highlighting
generic properties and illustrating those properties
with actual policies, where applicable. 
The wide variety of specific policy tools available to
policy decisionmakers can be categorized broadly as
(1) information dissemination tools, (2) economic
incentive tools, and (3) regulatory requirements. One
important difference among the three groups is the
degree to which producer participation would be vol-
untary (table 1). Fully voluntary approaches include
technical assistance and government cost sharing.
Instruments become increasingly prescriptive as eco-
nomic incentives are tied to performance, ending with
regulatory requirements as under the Clean Water Act. 
A second major difference among policy tools is the
role of government. Public personnel may simply
assist farmers by collecting and disseminating infor-
mation (e.g., educational and technical assistance pro-
grams). They might also, in a more direct role, define
recommended procedures for achieving certain
goals—a set of recommended best-management prac-
tices or requirements for third-party organic produce
certification. Finally and most directly, public agencies
could pay farmers who change their behavior (or levy
taxes on those who do not) or simply require that best-
management practices be implemented.
The third principal difference among policy tools is
the nature of the land management decision targeted.
A policy can be designed to influence/change farmers’
choices about how much (and which) land to farm
(land retirement). Or it can target decisions about how
cropland is used, which crops are produced and under
which practices and inputs (management and conser-
vation practices). 
Each policy tool has advantages and disadvantages;
their differences will manifest as different impacts on
farmers’ profits, taxpayer costs, consumer prices, and
environmental gains. The actual economic and envi-
ronmental effectiveness will depend on a range of
detailed design issues discussed later in the report
(“Analysis of Alternative Program Designs,” p. 36).
Here, we briefly describe each type of policy tool and
its advantages and disadvantages.
Education and Technical Assistance
Education and technical assistance provide informa-
tion to farmers to facilitate the adoption or use of
more environmentally benign practices. Assistance
can range from providing data, for example on soil
quality, or disseminating information about new tech-
nologies or practices—including which are best under
a given set of circumstances or how to operate them
to achieve the greatest gain—to helping farmers pre-
pare conservation plans.
Participation decision: Voluntary.
Government role: Provide information.
Land management target: Traditionally applied to
management and conservation practices.
Advantages: Public information gathering and distri-
bution may increase the use of conservation practices
by farmers unaware of their effectiveness or unsure
about how to adopt them. Private benefits to producers
may include lowering production costs, preserving soil
productivity, or reducing damage to their own
resources such as ground water.
Disadvantages: These programs are completely vol-
untary, with effectiveness largely dependent on
whether a given practice creates benefits for farmers
that offset the costs of adoption (Ribaudo, 1997).
Application: U.S. agri-environmental policy has long
relied on education and technical assistance. The old-
est, and largest, education and technical assistance pro-
gram is the Conservation Technical Assistance pro-
gram (CTA), founded in 1936. Real expenditures (in
constant dollar terms) for technical assistance followed
a slight upward trend to about 1970, and then leveled
off (or declined slightly) (Heimlich et al., 2000b). In
terms of Federal program expenditures, the importance
of technical assistance relative to land retirement has
declined precipitously since 1986 (fig. 1).
Government Labeling 
Standards for Private Goods
Government labeling standards for private goods help
create efficient private markets for goods produced
with environmentally sound practices. National certifi-Economic Research Service/USDA Agri-Environmental Policy at the Crossroads / AER-794  7
Table 1—A survey of public policy tools for addressing environmental effects of agriculture 
Policy tool Participation Government Role Selected U.S. Programs
Program title Acronym
Educational/ Voluntary Provide farmers with  Conservation Technical  CTA
Technical assistance information and training to Assistance
plan and implement practices
Government labeling Voluntary, Government sets standards, Organic certification None
standards for  but standard must  which must be met for certification
private goods be met for  typically involving voluntary
certification “eco-labeling" guidelines
Incentive policies: Voluntary Annual payments for retiring  Conservation Reserve Program  CRP
Land retirement land from crop production for Wetland Reserve Program  WRP
payments contract duration; contracts  and Emergency Wetland
generally long term (10 years  Reserve Program EWRP
- permanent)
Incentive policies: Voluntary Payments to offset the cost of Agricultural Conservation  ACP
Land use payments adopting specified best manage- Program1
ment practices; contracts  Water Quality Improvement   WQIP
intermediate run (5-10 years) Program1
Environmental Quality  EQIP
Incentives Program 
Wildlife Habitat Incentives  WHIP
Program
Incentive policies: Involuntary, Per-unit charges for failure None at the Federal level None
Environmental but payment  to meet environmental goals
taxes amount depends  
on behavior
Compliance  Involuntary, after  Sets standards for environmental  Conservation Compliance   None
mechanisms opt-in to Farm  performance and determines  Sodbuster  None
Program whether requirements are met  Swampbuster  None
before releasing payments 
Regulatory Involuntary Producers subject to regulations  Coastal Zone Management CZARA
requirements if voluntary measures do not  Act Reauthorization
achieve environmental goals Amendments 
Operations may be subject to 
effluent discharge permits  Clean Water Act WA
Use restrictions and bans on  Federal Insecticide, FIFRA
certain pesticides Fungicide and Rodenticide Act
Farmers may not "take" a  Endangered Species Act  ESA
member of a listed species; 
Agencies must protect and 
restore species and their habitats
1 Programs are no longer in effect; they were replaced in 1996 by EQIP.8  Agri-Environmental Policy at the Crossroads / AER-794 Economic Research Service/USDA
cation standards increase the informational value asso-
ciated with specialized labels. 
Participation decision: Voluntary.
Government role: Identify approved practices or
guidelines for certification, enforcement.
Land management target: Traditionally applied to
management practices.
Advantages: Certification standards assure consumers
of the meaning and value of specialized labels, and
make it easier for producers to capture price premiums
for products produced under environmentally friendly
practices. National certification standards can elimi-
nate confusion created by standards that vary by State,
facilitating interstate commerce in such products. 
Disadvantages: Certification standards will generally
be effective only where private gains from participa-
tion can be captured in a market setting. In some
cases, it will be difficult to link program participation
to measurable environmental benefits.
Application: USDA recently set uniform national
standards defining the term “organic” for both bulk
and processed products and at all stages of production
and marketing in an effort to encourage wider adop-
tion of low-input, organic crop production. To the
extent that organic farming increases production costs
per unit of output, relative to commercial farming,
farmers will be more likely to adopt such practices if
they can capture price premiums. Without clear stan-
dards for organic production practices, the line
between organic farming and traditional commercial
farming could blur and farmers adopting practices best
for the environment might be less competitive than
others. Standards can protect such farmers by requir-
ing that everyone marketing their output as organic
adopt at least a minimum set of required practices. 
Economic Incentive-Based Policies
Economic incentive-based policies can provide posi-
tive incentives (payments to farmers) designed to
encourage environmentally beneficial activities, or
negative incentives (taxes farmers pay) designed to
discourage environmentally harmful activities. In prac-
tice, only positive incentives have been implemented at
the Federal level in regard to agriculture. 
Economic-incentive instruments allow producers
greater flexibility of response than do regulatory
approaches (discussed below). Producers are free to
weigh the incentive (subsidy or tax) against the costs
they will encounter in making land use, management,
or conservation practice changes that could increase a
total subsidy payment or decrease a tax bill. Some
producers may find it advantageous to forgo subsidies
or pay a tax because the cost of making changes is
high. Other producers may make large changes in
response to the incentive. In this way, incentives can
direct agri-environmental activity toward producers
who can makes changes (achieve gains) at the lowest
cost. Hence, economists frequently hail incentive-
based policies as efficient tools for environmental
goals. Whether they are, in fact, efficient will depend
on the agri-environmental setting and the details of
the program design.4
Taxes and subsidies differ, of course, in their effect on
net farm income and on taxpayer burdens (both farm
income and taxpayer burden rise with subsidies and
fall with taxes). They also differ in the incentive they
create for expanding or contracting crop production.
Subsidies can encourage producers to expand crop
production while taxes can encourage producers to
contract production. A more detailed description of
three economic incentive options follows.
4 Later is this report, we show that the efficiency of a subsidy
incentive depends signficantly on the details of program design. 












Cost share and 
incentive payment 
programs Information and
technical assistance (CTA)Economic Research Service/USDA Agri-Environmental Policy at the Crossroads / AER-794  9
Cost-Share/Incentive Payment Policies
Cost-share/incentive payment policies pay farmers for
adopting or using environmentally desirable practices.
Cost-share policies typically pay 50 to 75 percent of
farmers’ adoption costs, while incentive payments
more broadly defined could include payments exceed-
ing farmers’ costs. 
Participation decision: Voluntary.
Government role: Determine targeted practices, pro-
vide direct payments.
Land management target: Traditionally applied to
management practices.
Advantages: Cost-share and incentive payment pro-
grams increase the likelihood that farmers will adopt
environmentally desirable practices by reducing the
net cost of doing so. The larger the payment, the
greater the range of practices likely to be adopted and
the higher the number of likely participants. Payments
that exceed the cost of adoption can provide income
support to farmers who adopt or use environmental
practices, compensating them for providing public
amenities such as clean water or wildlife habitat
(although landowners who are not farmers may cap-
ture some of the value of these payments (see box,
“Supporting Farm Incomes and Protecting the Envi-
ronment: The Case Where Farmers Are Not Landown-
ers”). Also, if farmers are required to improve their
environmental performance as a result of a separate
regulatory requirement, public subsidies for adopting
required practices would reduce (or eliminate) the
impact of that requirement on farm income. Finally,
incentive payment policies are conducive to voluntary
contracts spanning a number of years, ensuring conti-
nuity of practices over time.
Disadvantages: Participation in such programs is vol-
untary. Policies providing for less than 100 percent of
adoption costs will be effective only to the extent that
targeted practices provide private economic benefits
(in addition to the environmental benefits). Because
participation will increase as payment rates rise (also
increasing total program expenditures), it may be
expensive for taxpayers to fund and exact substantial
environmental change. In addition, without specific
controls, payments for targeted practices can induce
producers to expand crop acreage and thus exacerbate
environmental damages, even if average damages per
acre fall. These unintended consequences are
addressed at length later in this report.
Application: A number of incentive payment pro-
grams have dealt largely with how land is farmed,
including the Agricultural Conservation Program
(ACP) and its successor the Environmental Quality
Incentives Program (EQIP), and the Wildlife Habitat
Incentives Program (WHIP) (see appendix 1, “Major
Conservation Programs”). Traditionally, these pro-
grams focused on soil erosion but have expanded to
incorporate other environmental attributes. While they
have long been a mainstay of agri-environmental pol-
icy, total expenditures on these programs are small rel-
ative to expenditures on land retirement (fig. 1). 
EQIP was enacted in 1996 to combine and refocus 
a number of longstanding conservation cost
share/incentive payment programs (Ribaudo, 1997).
Unlike the programs it replaced (the ACP, Great
Plains Conservation Program, Colorado River Salinity
Program, and Water Quality Incentives Program) 50
percent of EQIP funds are earmarked for practices or
systems relating to livestock production. Moreover,
EQIP funds are to be targeted to achieve the greatest
possible environmental benefit per dollar of program
expenditure. The programs preceding EQIP were gen-
erally available to producers on a first-come, first-
served basis, and funds were divided more or less
evenly among political jurisdictions. 
EQIP has, in fact, focused a substantial share of pro-
gram resources (58 percent of EQIP funds) on live-
stock operations (see box, “Environmental Quality
Incentives Program”), especially management of live-
stock waste nutrients.5 Under EQIP, 20 percent of pro-
gram funds are allocated to livestock waste manage-
ment,6 a 50-percent increase in total funding for live-
stock waste management relative to ACP allocations in
1995. This increase is doubly significant since funding
for cost-share and income incentive programs like
EQIP has declined (in real dollars) over the past 15
years (fig. 2).
5 Local USDA-NRCS staff determine whether an activity is 
“livestock-related.” While there is no specific definition of a live-
stock-related activity, the term encompasses more than animal
waste management.
6 Source: ERS analysis of EQIP program data.10  Agri-Environmental Policy at the Crossroads / AER-794 Economic Research Service/USDA
Land Retirement Programs
Land retirement programs provide annual payments to
farmers for retiring land from crop production. Pay-
ments compensate farmers for forgone net revenues
(net benefits they would have received had they pro-
duced crops on that land). 
Participation decision: Voluntary.
Government role: Provide direct payments, select
lands to be retired.
Land management target: Land retirement.
Advantages: Land retirement programs are particularly
well suited for securing environmental benefits that
increase with the length of time land is removed from
crop production. For example, many wetland services
and other wildlife habitat arise only when the ecosys-
tem is fully established, a process that might take years.
Retirement programs are also useful for protecting
lands that cannot be sustainably farmed, such as those
with very steep slopes. As such, land retirement pro-
grams tend to run longer than other policies. By remov-
ing land from crop production, land retirement also
controls commodity supply, whether intentionally or as
a byproduct. Finally, land retired can be easily con-
firmed and, therefore, easily enforced.
Disadvantages: Land retirement policies cannot
address environmental damages from the vast majority
of cropland that remains in production. Also, because
program payments must cover the full value of the
land in crop production (rather than a cost for modify-
ing practices on land remaining in production), land
retirement programs may be more expensive, per acre,
than other policies discussed.
Application: Land retirement was used sporadically,
most notably under the ACP in the 1930’s and in the
Soil Bank program of the 1950’s, until the Conserva-
tion Reserve Program (CRP) began in 1985. Since the
mid-1980’s, land retirement has dominated Federal
spending on agri-environmental programs (fig. 1). The
CRP initially continued a tradition of land retirement
for soil conservation and commodity supply manage-
ment. Unlike previous programs, however, CRP eligi-
bility was restricted to highly erodible land to enhance
environmental performance. More than 36 million
acres—about 10 percent of U.S. cropland—were even-
tually enrolled in CRP (Osborn et al., 1995). (See
appendix 1, “Major Conservation Programs,” for a
program description.)
In 1990, the resource concerns of agri-environmental
policy were broadened, largely to address many offsite
problems (Zinn, 1991). An Environmental Benefits
Index (EBI) was adopted to target land for retirement
in the CRP based on environmental benefits and gov-
ernment costs. Wetland restoration on agricultural land
also accelerated after 1990 with enactment of the Wet-
land Reserve Program (WRP), which purchases long-
term, often permanent, easements. 
Using the EBI, CRP contracts are allocated among
bids based on generic environmental objectives like
water quality or wildlife habitat. In recent years, poli-
cymakers have created the Conservation Reserve
Enhancement Program (CREP) to focus a portion of
CRP resources on local environmental problems. In
Maryland, for example, the CREP is targeted to pro-
tect water quality in the Chesapeake Bay. In New
York, specific watersheds are targeted to protect the
drinking water supply for New York City. In Washing-
ton and Oregon, CREP programs focus on endangered
species habitat (Smith, 2000).
Environmental Taxes
Environmental taxes are per-unit charges for actions con-
tributing to environmental degradation. Charges may be
associated with emissions (such as a fixed dollar value
per pound of soil lost) or with input use (such as a fertil-
izer). They can be assessed on all units, or just on the










Funding for EQIP and predecessor programs
Program expenditures ($ mil.)
EQIP Predecessor programsEconomic Research Service/USDA Agri-Environmental Policy at the Crossroads / AER-794  11
number of units emitted or used above a given threshold.
Total tax payments would depend on the farmer’s behav-
ior; the further from the environmental goal, the higher
the payment. Farmers who meet those goals might incur
no additional costs from a tax program.
Participation decision: Involuntary.
Government role: Monitoring, enforcement, and col-
lection of tax. 
Land management target: Primarily management prac-
tices, but could be designed to address land retirement. 
Advantages: Environmental tax policies are consistent
with the “polluter pays” principle, and they do not pro-
mote expansion of environmentally damaging activities.
Disadvantages: Taxes have a negative impact on 
farm income. 
Application: Environmental taxes have not been used
as an agri-environmental policy mechanism at the Fed-
eral level, though a few State tax programs do exist.
For example, both Minnesota and Iowa tax agricultural
pesticides and fertilizer (Morris, 1994). However, tax
rates are too low to have a significant effect on the use
of pesticides or fertilizer. Tax revenues fund research
It may be difficult to support farm incomes—through agri-
environmental payments or otherwise—when farmers are
not landowners. About 40 percent of agricultural land is
rented from retired farmers, family members of deceased
farmers, or somebody else. Payments intended to support
farm income may instead be used to increase bids in the
competition for rental land. In recent years, cropland rental
rates have not declined, despite historically low commod-
ity prices, indicating that some portion of large Federal
farm income support payments (more than $20 billion in
2000) has supported land rental rates instead. 
Whether payments can, in fact, support the incomes of
tenant farmers depends on the nature of land rental
agreements and the type of management or conservation
practices being subsidized. Two types of tenure agree-
ments predominate in agriculture: cash rental agreements
(about 30 percent of cropland) and share rental agree-
ments (10 percent of cropland). Moreover, the level of
tenant and landowner responsibility and cost may depend
significantly on the type of management or conservation
practice involved. Environmentally motivated changes in
management or conservation practices may involve (1)
changes in crop production practices or (2) permanent
improvements on land itself, e.g., terraces, waterways,
manure handling facilities, etc. Permanent improvements
imply a higher level of landowner responsibility and cost. 
Under cash rental, tenants pay a fixed fee for use of the
land, pay all costs of production, retain the commodities
produced, and generally are paid all commodity program
benefits. When land rental markets are competitive, com-
modity program benefits generally accrue to landowners
in the form of high rental rates. Likewise, if agri-environ-
mental subsidies paid to farmers exceed the costs of prac-
tice adoption, a portion of this income support payment
may also accrue to landowners. 
Even if landowners have no stake in annual production,
they may receive a share of—or even all of—an agri-
environmental payment. Under the Environmental Qual-
ity Incentives Program (EQIP, see box), for example,
landowners are ultimately responsible for completion of
contract terms. USDA allows EQIP contracts to specify
any mutually agreed distribution of payments. Many con-
tracts, particularly those involving structures such as
manure management facilities for confined animals,
reportedly go entirely to the landlord. 
Under share rental agreements, tenants and landowners
typically share in crop revenues, costs of production, and
farm income support benefits. Agri-environmental sub-
sidy payments, as well as any change in revenues or
costs resulting from changes in management or conser-
vation practices, would be split according to the general
terms of the rental agreement. Because tenants generally
provide machinery, they may receive a larger share of
payments for changes involving machinery investment,
such as conservation tillage. On the other hand,
landowners are generally responsible for improvements
to the land and may receive a relatively large share when
changes involve land-related investment (e.g., terraces).
To the extent that landowners are able to negotiate a rel-
atively favorable division of the agri-environmental pay-
ment, they can capture some of the payment intended for
farm income support.
Supporting Farm Incomes and Protecting the Environment:
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on environmentally sustainable agriculture (Iowa) and
cleanup of agricultural chemical spills (Minnesota). 
Compliance Mechanisms
Compliance mechanisms require a basic level of envi-
ronmental compliance as a condition of eligibility for
other programs. This tool shares characteristics with
both government standards for private goods/actions
and economic incentives. It is similar to the former in
that the government establishes a set of approved prac-
tices, except that here compliance is linked to a direct
economic payment. Because existing programs are
used for leverage, compliance mechanisms require no
budget outlay for producer payments, although consid-
erable technical assistance is needed to develop con-
servation compliance plans.
Participation decision: Involuntary.7
Government role: Establish and determine whether
compliance standards are met.
Land management target: Land use, management, and
conservation practices.
Advantages: Compliance mechanisms are well suited
to certain agri-environmental problems that may be
more difficult to address with voluntary subsidy pro-
grams. For example, draining a wetland can trigger the
loss of Federal program benefits. In contrast, to protect
wetlands with a voluntary subsidy program, policy-
makers might find themselves having to pay for main-
tenance of all wetlands—a potentially expensive
proposition—or needing to decide which wetlands
have sufficient agricultural conversion potential to
warrant protection—a potentially difficult and divisive
task (Heimlich and Claassen, 1998b).
Disadvantages: The distribution of agri-environmental
incentives depends on the distribution of Federal farm
program payments. Many agri-environmental issues,
particularly emerging issues such as livestock waste
management, do not occur on farms that are the tradi-
tional clients of these programs. Also, if farm program
payments are countercyclical, program payments will
be low when prices, and therefore incentives for plow-
ing highly erodible land (HEL) or draining wetland,
are high (Heimlich et al., 1989).
Application: In 1985, the Food Security Act ushered in
a new era of agri-environmental policy. Perhaps the most
fundamental change in policy was the adoption of com-
pliance mechanisms to protect highly erodible soils and
wetlands. These mechanisms require certain resource
conservation activities in return for benefits from
selected Federal agricultural programs, most notably
price support loans and income support payments. 
 Under the sodbuster provision, producers who
bring HEL into crop production must apply strict
soil conservation systems(USDA/NRCS, 1996). 
 Conservation compliance requires conservation
systems on previously cropped HEL, albeit less
stringent systems than required by sodbuster. 
 Under swampbuster, producers who convert wet-
land for agricultural production can lose Federal
farm program payments.
The adoption of compliance mechanisms was a signifi-
cant step toward coordination in agricultural and agri-
environmental policy. The sodbuster and conservation
compliance provisions were enacted in conjunction
with the Conservation Reserve Program as part of an
overall strategy to reduce soil erosion. Producers who
choose not to meet conservation compliance require-
ments (because of cost, for example) could enroll land
in the CRP. Compliance mechanisms also redressed a
longstanding inconsistency between farm price and
income support programs—which encouraged farmers
to expand production, sometimes on environmentally
sensitive land—and conservation programs that sought
to mitigate the adverse effects of agricultural produc-
tion (Miranowski and Reichelderfer, 1985).
Regulatory Requirements
Regulatory requirements lie at the far end of the policy
spectrum in terms of the degree to which participation
is voluntary. Rather than attempting to facilitate or
encourage improved environmental performance, poli-
cymakers can simply require it. In the name of public
health and safety, a number of practices are banned
and safe application methods are required. The ban on
the production and application of the chemical DDT is
one such example. 
Participation decision: Involuntary.
7 Participation is technically voluntary. However, payments in
these programs are widely viewed as entitlements by producers,
are largely capitalized into the value of land (Barnard et al., 1997;
Duffy et al., 1994), and are generally built into producers’ financial
calculations. Consequently, we categorize this policy instrument as
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Government role: Establishing standards, monitoring,
and enforcement.
Land management target: Management practices and
land retirement.
Advantages: Regulatory requirements can be the most
effective of all policy tools in effecting changes to
improve environmental quality, assuming that regula-
tions are adequately enforced. Unlike policy choices in
which farmer participation is uncertain, regulations
simply require that all farmers participate. This feature
is particularly important if the consequences of not
changing are drastic or irreversible. 
Disadvantages: Regulatory requirements can be the
least flexible of all policy instruments, requiring that
producers reach a specific environmental goal or
adopt specific practices. Producers are not free to
determine their own level of participation, based on
their costs. Unless regulators know farm-specific costs
and can use this information to establish farm-specific
regulations, agri-environmental effort is not necessar-
ily directed toward producers who can make changes
(achieve gains) at the lowest cost. Consequently, regu-
lation can be less flexible and less efficient that eco-
nomic incentives. 
Application: Regulatory requirements are rare within
traditional agri-environmental policy. However, farm-
ers operate within an increasingly complex regulatory
environment. Federal laws most likely to impact farm
operations include the Coastal Zone Act Reauthoriza-
tion Amendments (CZARA), which targets agricultural
nonpoint-source runoff affecting coastal waters; the
Clean Water Act (CWA), which regulates the deposit
of dredge and fill materials in wetlands; the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA),
which regulates the use of farm chemicals; and the
Endangered Species Act (ESA), which aims to protect
species in danger of going extinct (see appendix 1,
“Major Conservation Programs”). The Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) is currently developing regu-
lations regarding the management of animal waste
from large confined animal operations under authority
provided by the CWA. 
In sum, a wide variety of tools are available to policy
decisionmakers. Tools range from direct to indirect
and voluntary to involuntary, from information provi-
sion and technical assistance to policies that dictate
farmers’ practices or performance levels. Some tools
provide a direct economic incentive to encourage par-
ticipation. Some policies are better suited for influenc-
ing decisions regarding cropping and management
practices on land in production; others are better suited
for addressing environmental implications of decisions
on whether to retire land. 
Despite this wide range of options, USDA agri-envi-
ronmental policy in the past two decades has relied
primarily on two tools: economic incentives for long-
term land retirement and compliance mechanisms for
soil conservation on land remaining in production and
to discourage conservation of wetlands to crop produc-
tion. Cost sharing and technical assistance programs
exist as well, but are significantly smaller than land
retirement in terms of total expenditures and than com-
pliance mechanisms in terms of acreage affected. In
the following section, we discuss the environmental
gains that can be associated with past programs, and
highlight policy design features that contributed to
their relative successes and failures.14  Agri-Environmental Policy at the Crossroads / AER-794 Economic Research Service/USDA
The Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP)
provides technical, financial, and educational assistance
for a wide range of agri-environmental activities.
Through 1999, $466 million was obligated in 64,361
contracts covering 26.8 million acres of agricultural land,
including nearly 7 million acres of cropland. Payments
are proportional to the number of farms across resource
regions, except in the Basin and Range where payments
relative to the number of farms tend to be greater (see
appendix 6, “ERS Farm Resource Regions”).
Five categories of conservation practices are being
funded: crop-related nutrient management, livestock-
related nutrient management, soil erosion and land pro-
tection, water resources management, and other resource
concerns. Thirty-nine percent of EQIP funds are being
allocated toward water resources management practices,
ranging from more efficient irrigation systems to live-
stock drinking troughs. Soil erosion and land protection
practices account for 30 percent of all funding. While 58
percent of EQIP funds are devoted to livestock-related
activities, 20 percent of funds have been designated
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EQIP’s targeting, in environmental terms, varies signifi-
cantly across the ERS Farm Regions. Practices associ-
ated with management of livestock waste obtain the
lion’s share of funds in the Northern Crescent, Eastern
Uplands, and Southern Seaboard where there is, in fact,
an overriding concern surrounding these issues. In the
Western United States (e.g., Northern Great Plains,
Basin and Range, Fruitful Rim, and Prairie Gateway
regions), where water scarcity is high profile, the major-
ity of EQIP funds are allocated to improve water man-
agement practices. In the Heartland and the Prairie
Gateway regions, which include 44 percent of the
Nation’s cropland, a large share of the funds are used to
prevent soil erosion (the Heartland has the highest share
of its expenditures allocated for soil erosion control).
The Mississippi Portal is the one region where water
resource and soil erosion practices are assigned approxi-
mately equal shares of the budget.
Distribution of EQIP funding
Basin and Range
Northern Great Plains Heartland
Fruitful Rim
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A Conservation Program 
Retrospective: Gains Made 
And Lessons Learned, 
1980-2000
A look at recent agri-environmental programs reveals
significant environmental gains. A closer look at the
agri-environmental gains, in turn, provides some les-
sons on the merits of past program features. 
Agri-Environmental Gains
To date, measurements of physical and economic
gains have been attempted only for major agri-envi-
ronmental programs: conservation compliance and the
Conservation Reserve Program. Data on the impacts
of smaller programs are scarce, which means it is dif-
ficult to measure their environmental effectiveness rel-
ative to costs. However, since the excluded agri-envi-
ronmental programs are small, their environmental
gains relative to those of the major programs can be
expected to be small.8
Soil Erosion Has Been 
Significantly Reduced 
Between 1982 and 1997, total erosion on U.S. crop-
land fell from 3.08 to 1.89 billion tons/year, a decline
of roughly 1.2 billion tons/year or nearly 40 percent.
Of this, just over half, 641 million tons/year, was due
to reductions in sheet and rill (water) erosion, while
552 million tons/year was due to reductions in wind
erosion (table 2). Farm conservation programs—espe-
cially conservation compliance and the Conservation
Reserve Program—have helped bring about reductions
in soil erosion (Magleby et al., 1995).
Conservation compliance has helped reduce erosion
on land that remains in crop production. Conservation
compliance required farmers to file and implement an
approved conservation plan on nearly 91 million acres
of cropped HEL to remain eligible for many farm pro-
grams (Hyberg, 1997). In 1997, approved conserva-
tion systems were in operation on more than 95 per-
cent of all land subject to compliance (Claassen et al.,
2000). Furthermore, once farmers have adopted con-
servation or reduced tillage practices on their HEL,
they may be more likely to use these same practices
on their non-HEL.
Total erosion on cropped HEL was 323 million
tons/year lower in 1997 than in 1982; erosion on non-
HEL cropland decreased by 319 million tons/year
(table 2).9 The nearly equal decline in erosion on HEL
and non-HEL cropland, despite the lower erosion rate
on non-HEL, is explained, in part, by the 3-to-1 ratio
of non-HEL to HEL acres nationwide. 
Government programs may not be the only factor
reducing erosion. Erosion reductions may also be the
result of technological advances in the production and
design of conservation-related inputs. For example, a
recent improvement in corn planters ensures even
spacing of the seed despite the level of crop residue.
Technological advances increase the profitability, and
thus the adoption, of some conservation practices. 
The Conservation Reserve Program reduced erosion
by taking cropland out of production and requiring that
a permanent cover be established. The Conservation
Reserve Program selected HEL when the program
began in 1985 and was expanded to include HEL and
non-HEL after 1991. Total CRP acreage has ranged
from 30 to 36 million acres since the late 1980’s.
Approximately 31.5 million acres were enrolled as of
June 15, 2000, at an average per-acre rental rate of $45
(USDA, FSA, 2000b). 
On land enrolled in the CRP in 1997, total erosion was
406 million tons/year in 1982 (table 2). However, this
number does not represent the CRP’s total impact on
soil erosion for several reasons. First, the CRP reduces
erosion to very low levels, but not to zero. Second,
with conservation compliance, erosion on many of
these acres would have fallen without the CRP. Third,
the CRP helped raise commodity prices, which
brought more land into production (USDA, FSA,
1997). This “slippage” comes from converting hayland
or pastureland to cropland, thus increasing erosion. 
The erosion due to slippage is difficult to assess
because other factors also affected farmland conver-
sions. First, the sodbuster provision of conservation
compliance discouraged farmers from converting HEL
to cropland. Second, compliance was encouraging
8 Expenditures on conservation practices through EQIP, which
tends to be significant among remaining programs, averaged $155
million/year from 1997 through 1999 (see box, “EQIP”)—approxi-
mately one-tenth those of the CRP. 
9Estimates of changes in erosion between 1982 to 1997 are based
on ERS analysis of National Resources Inventory (NRI) data of the
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farmers to take HEL out of crop production. And
third, changes in world commodity markets affected
domestic prices and also affected crop acreage. Thus,
the effects of slippage, sodbuster, and conservation
compliance on land conversions and on erosion are
not separated.10
The public gains when soil erosion is decreased.
Reductions in sheet and rill erosion have improved
surface-water quality, which increases the public’s
enjoyment of water-based recreation and decreases
costs to municipalities, industry, and other public and
private sectors. Reductions in wind erosion reduce air-
borne dust, which betters human health, reduces
household chores (sweeping windblown dirt from side-
walks, cleaning within homes, etc.), lowers some costs
to industries, and increases the visibility of scenic vis-
tas. Reduced soil erosion also helps maintain soil pro-
ductivity, which increases food security. Because the
farmer is not able to market and to be paid for these
benefits of reduced soil erosion, they are referred to as
“nonmarket” goods or impacts.
Conservation compliance is estimated to provide non-
market benefits of $1.4 billion/year. Erosion reductions
by the CRP are estimated to provide $694 million/year
in nonmarket benefits (table 3).11 These values include
impacts to water-based recreation, soil productivity,
municipal and industrial uses, and household chores.
This likely understates the true value of the reduced
soil erosion because benefits associated with increases
in waterfowl populations, improvements in coastal and
estuarine recreation areas, increased likelihood of sur-
vival of endangered species, increases in marine fish-
eries’ populations, and decreases in the cost that air-
borne soil imposes on industries, scenic views, and
others have not been included. 
Wetland Restoration Has Exceeded Losses 
Perhaps the most dramatic change in agri-environmen-
tal performance has been with respect to wetlands.
Trends in wetland conversion and conservation pro-
grams have helped agriculture become a net restorer of
wetlands. The rate of wetland conversion in agriculture
has dropped sharply in recent decades, reducing the
overall rate of net wetland loss (Heimlich et al., 2000a;
Heimlich et al., 1997). Through the Wetland Reserve
Program (WRP), agriculture has become the single
largest source of U.S. wetland restoration (Heimlich et
al., 2000a; Heimlich et al., 1998). 
Table 2—Soil erosion reduction in the United States 1982-97
Soil erosion reduction, 1982-97
Item (million tons/year)
Net reduction in total erosion on cropland from 1982 to 1997 (percent change) 1,192.7 (38.9)
Net reduction in sheet and rill erosion on cropland from 1982 to 1997 640.7
Net reduction in wind erosion on cropland from 1982 to 1997 552.0
Erosion on HEL cropped in 1982 and 19971 322.9
Erosion on non-HEL cropped in 1982 and 19972 319.4
Erosion in 1982 on cropland enrolled in CRP in 19973 406.0
Net change due to non-CRP land use change4 144.4
1The erosion change on HEL cropped in 1982 and 1997. Therefore, it does not account for the erosion reduction associated with any HEL
that was cropped in 1982 but in pasture, hay, or the CRP in 1997. It does not include the erosion increase on the non-HEL that was pasture
or hay land in 1982 and cropped in 1997.
2The erosion change on non-HEL cropped in 1982 and 1997. Therefore, it does not account for the erosion increase on non-HEL that was
pasture or hay land in 1982 and cropped in 1997. It does not account for the erosion decrease on non-HEL that was cropped in 1982 but in
pasture, hay, or the CRP in 1997.
3Erosion on CRP land is very low but not zero. Thus this figure would be slightly larger than the actual reduction in erosion.
4The net change in erosion on land that was cropped in 1982 but not cropped or in the CRP in 1997 and of land that was not cropped in 1982
but cropped in 1997. In other words, this is net change in erosion on land cropped in either 1982 or 1997 but not in the CRP. This category
includes the cropland excluded from the three previous categories.
Source: ERS analysis of 1997 National Resource Inventory (NRI) Data.
10 The total effect of these factors and of slippage reduced annual
erosion by 144 million tons from 1982 to 1997 (table 2).
11 Each benefit estimate assumes typical agricultural production
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Wetlands provide myriad ecological, biological, and
hydrological functions (e.g., wildlife habitat, water
quality, and floodwater retention) (Novitski et al.,
1996). For example, filtering sediment and nutrients
improves water quality, enhancing the value of down-
stream and underground waters (Carter, 1996;
Williams, 1996). 
The adequacy of wetland protection and restoration
programs is currently assessed in relation to the goal
of “no net loss” of wetland functions and values
(Heimlich et al., 1998; Conservation Foundation,
1988). Because wetland functions and values are diffi-
cult to assess, no net loss of wetland area has often
been used as a proxy for no net loss of wetland func-
tions and values. 
On the wetland conversion side of the ledger, conver-
sions for agricultural production have decreased steadily
in recent decades (fig. 3). Conversion of wetlands for
crop production averaged 593,000 acres per year in
1954-74 (Frayer et al., 1983), but dropped to 235,000
acres for 1974-84 (Dahl and Johnson, 1991). Between
1982 and 1992 (the latest year data are available), gross
agricultural wetland conversion fell to roughly 31,000
acres per year (Heimlich and Melanson, 1995). 
The decline in the rate of agricultural wetland conver-
sion has been attributed to several factors. First, roughly
half of all wetlands in the conterminous United States in
1780 have been drained, including larger proportions in
some heavily agricultural States such as Iowa, Illinois,
Indiana, Ohio, and California (Dahl, 1990). Remaining
wetlands may be more difficult or expensive to convert
or may be less productive once converted. Second, the
long-term decline in the real price of agricultural com-
modities has reduced the potential benefit of wetland
conversion (Tolman, 1997; Kramer and Shabman,
1993). Finally, policy change has been a factor. Section
404 of the Clean Water Act of 1972 regulates discharge
of dredge and fill material into wetlands, and the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 eliminated tax preferences that
encouraged wetland drainage. Under the swampbuster
provisions of the 1985, 1990, and 1996 farm bills, pro-
ducers who convert wetlands for crop production can be
denied a wide range of farm program benefits. 
Evidence on the role of policy change in reducing wet-
land conversion for agriculture is mixed (see Heimlich
et al., 1998, for a full survey). Some analysts have
concluded that wetland conversion for agricultural pro-
duction has simply become unprofitable, with or with-
out swampbuster sanctions (Tolman, 1997; Kramer

















Table 3—Environmental performance of conservation programs
Environmental performance measure Program Nonmarket benefits
($million/year)
Soil erosion reduced




1Based on per-acre conservation compliance benefit measures and the 91 million acres meeting compliance in 1997 (Hyberg, 1997).
2Includes freshwater-based recreation benefits of $129 mil/yr (Feather et al., 1999), increases to soil productivity of $145 mil/year (Young
and Osborn, 1990), impacts to costs of municipal water cleaning, dredging, etc. of $366 mil./yr (Ribaudo, 1989), and health impacts $50
mil/yr (Ribaudo et al., 1990). To be consistent with recreation estimates, all other reported values were adjusted to represent annual values on
35 million acres, a common approximate level of program enrollment.
3Benefits of wildlife viewing and pheasant hunting on CRP from Feather et al. (1999). Program acreage selected with an EBI.Economic Research Service/USDA Agri-Environmental Policy at the Crossroads / AER-794  19
potential productivity of wetland soils, other work has
estimated that, without swampbuster, 5.8 to 13.2 mil-
lion acres of wetlands would be converted to cropland
(Heimlich et al., 1998). Claassen and others (2000)
estimate that between 1.5 and 3.3 million acres of wet-
lands are being preserved with swampbuster compli-
ance, depending on producer price expectations. 
On the wetland restoration side of the ledger, agricul-
ture is a leading sector in wetland restoration. USDA’s
Wetland Reserve Program (WRP) and Emergency
Wetland Reserve Program (EWRP) have restored more
than 990,000 acres of agricultural land to wetland sta-
tus (USDA, NRCS, 2000c), an average rate of nearly
110,000 acres per year—between three and four times
the rate of gross wetland conversion to agriculture cal-
culated for 1982-92 (Heimlich et al., 2000a). Cropped
wetlands also account for 1.6 million acres enrolled in
CRP; roughly one-third of these acres are actual wet-
lands, the rest is upland buffer acreage. A number of
smaller programs also restore wetlands on agricultural
land, but at a combined rate of less than 12,000 acres
per year (Heimlich et al., 1998). 
Wildlife Habitat on Agricultural 
Land Is Enhanced 
The availability of permanent cover, in some parts 
of the country, has grown significantly, primarily
through the CRP. The CRP has provided 30 to 36
million acres of cover since the late 1980’s, although
slippage (the conversion of land to cropland) again
reduces the program’s net contribution. Wetland pro-
tection and restoration, through swampbuster and the
WRP, have also contributed significantly to enhanc-
ing wildlife habitat. 
Permanent cover greatly improves the health of
wildlife ecosystems. The permanent cover of the CRP
and the habitat diversity it adds to intensely cropped
landscapes provide nesting cover, wintering habitat,
and plant and insect feeds for most wildlife species not
indigenous to forestland. This includes the large class
of upland species. 
The WRP has increased the availability of a unique
habitat used by the greatest diversity of wildlife
species. Wetlands are the most biologically productive
ecosystems in the temperate regions, rivaling tropical
rain forests (Mitsch and Gosselink, 1993). A wide
variety of fish, birds, mammals, reptiles, insects, and
plants take advantage of the wetlands’ various func-
tions. Over a third of all bird species in North America
rely on wetlands for migratory resting stops, breeding
or feeding grounds, or cover from predation
(Kroodsma, 1979). 
Increases in fish and wildlife populations provide the
public better wildlife viewing, fishing, and hunting.
These are nonmarket goods or benefits that the con-
serving farmer is unable to sell.12
The value of the CRP’s improvements to wildlife
viewing and to pheasant hunting has been estimated at
$704 million/year (table 3). This represents a lower-
bound estimate of wildlife benefits because it does not
include improved hunting for many other species and
the increased protection of threatened and endangered
species. Note too that some impacts can be unex-
pected. For example, the added CRP acres in the
Northern Plains have significantly increased duck pop-
ulations, which require dense vegetative cover within 3
miles of the wetland for successful nesting (Reynolds
et al., 1994). 
The impacts of farm programs, as measured here, are
lower-bound estimates because only major agri-envi-
ronmental programs are included and because numer-
ous wildlife, wetland, and soil erosion impacts have
not been assessed. Furthermore, impacts on other agri-
environmental resources—many of significant public
concern—are not included. These include impacts on:
 Chemical loadings in water and the environment—
Land retirement programs will decrease nutrient and
pesticide use, although slippage offsets some reduc-
tions. Conservation tillage slightly increases herbi-
cide use but leads to little change in nutrient and
insecticide use (Padgitt et al., 1997). Any decrease
in agri-chemical use can help decrease loadings in
ground and surface water and in wildlife food
sources.
 Climate change—Land in retirement programs
increases the soil’s carbon sequestration, which
12 Farmers do sell fishing or hunting access to pond-raised or pen-
raised species. Because farmers hold property rights on these
species and they are not dependent on wild ecosystems, the hunt-
ing and fishing of pond- and pen-raised species are not considered
here. In limited cases, farmers sell access to species dependent on
wild ecosystems. However, unless the farmer owns full access to
affected water bodies and the essential parts of wildlife ecosys-
tems, environmental impacts will not be privatized. For example,
the farmer who provides the essential nesting and winter habitat
may see many of the pheasant raised on his/her land hunted in the
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reduces atmospheric carbon loads. For example, a
CRP acre in the Great Plains is estimated to sink
approximately 0.85 metric ton of carbon per year
(Lewandrowski et al., 2000). These benefits are tem-
porary, however; should the acreage move back into
crop production, the sequestered carbon will be
released. Soil conservation practices associated with
conservation compliance, including reduced tillage
systems and use of winter cover crops, are also
credited with reducing atmospheric carbon loads
(Kern and Johnson, 1993; Lal et al., 1998).
 Groundwater quality and availability—Land retire-
ment, through both the CRP and the WRP, helps
improve the quantity and quality of groundwater
recharge. The CRP is designed to account for poten-
tial groundwater quality impacts of fields offered for
enrollment when a field is located in a groundwater
protection area (table 4). The WRP restores wet-
lands, which not only improve groundwater
resources by filtering chemicals from recharge but
increase the rate or quantity of groundwater
recharge (USDA/NRCS, 1997).
Lessons Learned
Factors That Sustain Environmental Gains 
Only one program—the Wetlands Reserve Program—
ensures permanent environmental gains through the
purchase of permanent easements. For other programs,
environmental gains are not sustained unless the pro-
grams themselves are sustained and the program
incentives remain adequate. Failing that, farmers must
find it profitable to maintain the land use or conserva-
tion practices. 
If the CRP were eliminated, some portion of land
would continue in the program until all contracts
expire (no more than 15 years). When a contract
expires, landowners are free to return land to crop pro-
duction, although conservation compliance require-
ments must be met if the farmer is to remain eligible
for many USDA programs (see box, “Conservation
Compliance Requirements”). Whether land is returned
to crop production depends on whether the landowner
believes crop production will be more profitable than
economic use of the existing land cover (e.g., the
farmer may maintain tree cover). Profitability will
depend on commodity prices relative to production
costs (Osborn et al., 1993) and the productivity of land
under the expiring CRP contract (Johnson et al., 1997;
Johnson and Segarra, 1995). 
Enterprise mix and related investments also appear to
influence the likelihood of post-CRP conversions.
Farmers who produce both crops and cattle are less
likely than crop producers to say they will return CRP
land to crop production (Johnson et al., 1997; Cooper
and Osborn, 1997). Land irrigated prior to CRP enroll-
ment may be more likely to return to crop production
(Skaggs et al., 1994). Larger tracts of CRP land may
be more likely than smaller tracts to be returned to
crop production because small acreages are less likely
to be productive or add significantly to farm revenue
(Skaggs et al., 1994).
Socio-economic factors may also determine post-CRP
land use. Producers who were motivated by conserva-
tion concerns to enroll land (Johnson et al., 1997),
have obtained off-farm employment (Skaggs et al.,
1994), or who are retired (Cooper and Osborn, 1997)
are less likely to return land to crop production. Con-
tract holders who are older but not retired (Skaggs et
al., 1994) and those who are more risk-averse (John-
son and Segarra, 1995) are more likely to return land
to crop production.
Sustaining gains achieved from conservation compli-
ance, sodbuster, and swampbuster provisions depends
on: (1) the size of Federal farm program payments that
can be withheld relative to the costs of complying with
HEL and wetland conservation requirements; and (2)
the extent to which producers with highly erodible
land (HEL) or wetlands on their farms participate in
Federal farm programs. It is difficult to predict future
farm programs or producer participation. Although evi-
dence suggests that farm support programs will con-
tinue into the foreseeable future, it is reasonable to ask
whether gains in soil conservation and wetland protec-
tion could be sustained without the incentive provided
by these programs through compliance mechanisms. 
Conservation compliance requires application of
approved conservation systems (see box “Conservation
Compliance Requirements”). Once established, the
cost of maintaining conservation systems may be quite
low, especially in cases where a significant capital
investment is required. Conservation tillage—used on
33 percent of the HEL acres subject to compliance
(table 5)—may have reduced per-unit production costs
in many cases, although studies of the production effi-
ciency of conservation tillage suggest that conservation
tillage is not equally well adapted in all soil and cli-
mate conditions (Sandretto, 1997; McBride, 1999).
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machinery is made, its continued and extended use
may prove practical. Terraces—used in 13 percent of
conservation systems—also require a significant capi-
tal investment (table 5). Once in place, terraces are rel-
atively inexpensive to maintain.
Other practices are less likely to be maintained in the
absence of an effective compliance incentive. Conser-
vation cropping sequences—included in 81 percent of
the conservation compliance systems—may be aban-
doned if less profitable than other sequences. However,
because available data do not fully describe the con-
servation cropping sequences, an assessment has not
been possible. Producers may also choose to remove
grassed waterways and field borders—included in
plans covering 9.2 and 3 percent of HEL cropland
(table 5)—because they take land out of production.
Producers may also drain some wetlands or plow some
previously uncropped HEL in the absence of effective
swampbuster13 and sodbuster14 provisions. However,
some authors have suggested that wetland conversion
for crop production is no longer profitable, with or
without swampbuster sanctions (Kramer and Shabman,
1993; Tolman, 1997). Similar arguments could be
made with respect to conversion of HEL, but little for-
mal research has been carried out on HEL conversion
in recent years. New research, based on more detailed
data than used in past efforts, indicates that 7.1 million
to 14.1 million acres of wetland and HEL could be
Table 4—Factors generating points for the Conservation Reserve Program's environmental benefit index1
EBI factor Definition Features that increase points Maximum points
Wildlife  Evaluates the  •Diversity of grass/legumes 100
expected wildlife  •Use of native grasses
benefits of the offer. •Tree planting
•Wetlands restoration
•Beneficial to threatened/endangered species
•Complements wetland habitat
Water quality Evaluates the potential  •Located in ground or surface water  100
surface and ground water protection area
impacts •Potential for percolation of chemicals 
and the local population using groundwater
•Potential for runoff to reach surface water 
and the county population
Erosion Evaluates soil erodibility  •Larger field-average rate of estimated  100
of field soil erosion
Enduring benefits Evaluates the likelihood  •Tree cover 50
of CRP cover to remain  •More points for hardwoods
Air quality Evaluates gains from  •Potential for dust to affect people 35
reduced dust •Potential for wind erosion
Conservation Priority  Evaluates potential to  •Located within a CPA 25
Area (CPA) improve a CPA
Cost Evaluates cost of parcel •Lower CRP rent  Varies
•No government cost share
•Payment is below program's maximum 
acceptable for area and soil type
1This table includes the most common and highest scoring practices. For more information, see USDA, FSA, 1999.
13 The discharge of dredged and fill materials in wetlands is regu-
lated under the Clean Water Act. These provisions have been used
to regulate wetland drainage. However, this authority has not been
effective in regulating wetland conversion for agricultural produc-
tion. See Heimlich and others (1998) for a full discussion. 
14 HEL can be converted to crop production without sodbuster vio-
lation if a stringent and potentially expensive conservation system
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profitably converted to crop production without
swampbuster and sodbuster, depending on producers’
commodity price expectations (Claassen et al., 2000). 
Similar issues apply to voluntary agri-environmental pro-
grams such as EQIP. To the extent that these programs
leverage conservation investments with low maintenance
costs or promote practices that reduce costs or provide
other ongoing benefits to producers, e.g., protection of
their own ground water, these investments or practices
are more likely to be retained over the long term.
Because technical assistance and cost-share programs
require producers to pay part of the cost of conservation
practices, producers who participate in EQIP or other
cost-share programs are likely to adopt only those prac-
tices that reduce costs or provide other ongoing benefits.
Features That Provide Greater Environmental
Gains Relative to Costs
Features of recent agri-environmental programs now
allow these programs to provide more environmental
quality relative to costs. Gains can be measured in phys-
ical or economic terms, with economic measures captur-
ing the nonmarket value of the improvements in envi-
ronmental amenities. Costs are represented by the net
decrease in incomes of taxpayers, consumers, and farm-
ers. (Although incomes of some groups may rise, they
can be more than offset by losses in other groups.)
Consistency among farm and environmental pro-
grams improves agri-environmental protection. It was
recognized in the mid-1980’s that Federal commodity,
loan, and crop insurance programs often induce pro-
duction patterns that are inconsistent with soil conser-
vation and water quality goals (Reichelderfer, 1985).
This effect was unintentional, and arose from a com-
plicated and unanticipated set of policy interactions. A
history of land set-asides to achieve production con-
trols for particular commodities led to an artificial
scarcity of land, consequential hikes in farmland val-
ues, induced development of land-saving technologies,
and a more intensive set of production systems, espe-
cially in times of high prices (Miranowski and
Reichelderfer, 1985). Before 1985, a land owner/oper-
ator might be receiving commodity program payments
that encouraged expansion of input-intensive produc-
tion on additional land, while also receiving conserva-
tion cost-share payments to reduce the agri-environ-
mental damages from that same production. The 1985
farm bill explicitly recognized this inconsistency, and
attempted to reconcile it with conservation compliance
Conservation compliance requires all farmers who pro-
duce crops on highly erodible land (HEL) and who
receive or request certain USDA benefits to have an
approved conservation system applied on those lands.
Violations may result in disqualification from USDA
programs or reduction of benefits. Conservation com-
pliance was enacted in the 1985 farm bill. Producers
were required to devise USDA-approved conservation
plans by 1990 and to actively apply the conservation
systems called for in the plans by 1995.
An approved conservation system is a set of field-spe-
cific cropping and managerial soil conservation prac-
tices designed in cooperation with local NRCS agents
to reduce soil erosion. Basic conservation systems
reduce erosion to the soil tolerance level. The soil tol-
erance level, or T, is the rate of soil erosion that can
continually occur on specific soil without reducing its
productivity. Soil erosion rates are estimated using the
Universal Soil Loss Equation (Wischmeier and Smith,
1978) and the Wind Erosion Equation (Skidmore and
Woodruff, 1968). Alternative conservation systems are
allowed where basic conservation systems would place
an excessive economic burden on producers. These
systems must provide “significant” erosion reduction,
but producers are not required to reduce erosion to the
T level. The 1996 farm act requires that plans devel-
oped after July 3, 1996, reduce erosion by at least 75
percent of potential erodibility, not to exceed 2T. On
land returning to crop production from the Conserva-
tion Reserve Program (CRP), however, conservation
compliance requirements cannot exceed the require-
ment existing when the land entered the CRP.
Based on the FSA 1997 Conservation Compliance
Status Review data (the most recent review data avail-
able), 95.9 percent of producers were actively apply-
ing conservation systems. Two percent of producers
were actively applying conservation systems with
variances. Fewer than 0.1 percent of operators subject
to conservation compliance were not actively applying
conservation systems in 1997. 
Conservation systems are made up of conservation
practices, such as conservation tillage or terraces.
While 1,674 different combinations of conservation
practices are approved as conservation compliance sys-
tems (Claassen et al., 2000), most systems are combi-
nations of a handful of practices.
Conservation Compliance 
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provisions and a CRP that melded conservation and
supply control objectives. 
In retrospect, the program consistency or coordination
aspects of the 1985 legislation were highly successful.
The conservation compliance, sodbuster, and swamp-
buster provisions assured that in order to participate in
commodity and other farm programs, participants had
to meet a minimum standard for environmental protec-
tion. Incentives to expand cropland into environmen-
tally sensitive areas to build the “base” upon which
commodity program benefits were multiplied ended in
1986 with a new base acreage calculus. And the CRP
further targeted for retirement a large portion of that
expansion acreage, about which there were environ-
mental worries. 
Program consistency and coordination remain con-
cerns, however. As of 1996, federally subsidized crop
insurance cannot be withheld from producers who vio-
late conservation compliance, sodbuster, and swamp-
buster. Yet most empirical evidence suggests that the
availability of subsidized crop insurance does result in
expanding cropland acreage (Young et al., 1999; Kee-
ton et al., 1999; Wu, 1999; ). Griffin (1996) argues that
much of the erosion reduction achieved in the Great
Plains through CRP was offset by shifting land from
pasture or hay to crop production to capitalize on sub-
sidized crop insurance and disaster payments. Good-
win and others (1999) obtained similar results. 
While some proposals for future legislation, such as
the Conservation Security Program, do address agri-
environmental issues and farm income simultaneously,
there is little evidence that the issue of program coor-
dination among future programs is getting a lot of
attention. Nevertheless, it is only by explicitly address-
ing how future farm, commodity, insurance, resource
conservation, and agri-environmental programs will
interact that inherent inconsistencies can be minimized
and complementarities found.
Producers have utilized flexibility in the conservation
compliance program. In many cases, farmers can
Table 5—The nine most widely used conservation compliance practices
Soil conservation  Definition HEL acres Requires  May provide  Removes 
practice using practice1 large initial  cost savings land from 
(percent) investment production
Conservation cropping Crop rotation that preserves  81.1
organic residue and improves 
soil tilth
Crop residue use Plant residue to protect cultivated  51.3
fields during critical erosion periods
Conservation tillage System in which at least 30 percent 
of surface is covered by plant residue  33.0 X2 X
after planting
Contour farming Preparing, planting, and cultivating 
land on the contour 19.3
Terrace Earth embankment, channel, or 
ridge and channel across slope 13.0 X
Grassed waterway Natural or constructed channel to 
provide for stable runoff 9.2 X X
Surface roughening Roughening soil by ridge or clod 
forming tillage 4.6
Cover/green manure Grasses, legumes, or small grain 
for seasonal protection and soil  3.4
improvement
Field border Strip of perennial vegetation on 
edge of field 3.0 X X
1Source: USDA, ERS, compiled from NRCS 1997 Status Review of Conservation Compliance data. Percentages sum to more than 100
because of multiple practices being applied to the same land.
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change production methods in more than one way
(e.g., crop rotations, tillage practices, etc.) to achieve
an environmental objective. A program is flexible if
producers are allowed to select the production methods
most suitable to their economic objectives yet consis-
tent with the environmental goals of the program. 
Flexibility can reduce costs to growers of participating
in or complying with an agri-environmental program.
The geophysical and biological environment, as well
as producer management skills, production practices,
preferences, and attitudes regarding environmental per-
formance, vary widely among agricultural producers,
even within small geographic areas. A specific conser-
vation practice may fit well into one farming operation
and boost environmental benefits, but increase produc-
tion costs or provide little environmental gains when
adopted by others. Thus, a one-size-fits-all agri-envi-
ronmental program is unlikely to minimize costs.
The implementation of conservation compliance pro-
vided great producer flexibility. The program requires
application of soil-conserving production systems on
highly erodible cropland as a condition of farm pro-
gram eligibility but gives producers significant latitude
in customizing conservation plans (see box, “Conser-
vation Compliance Requirements”). The program goal
is to reduce erosion (as estimated by the Universal Soil
Loss Equation (USLE) or the Wind Erosion Equation
(WEE)) to a level that can be sustained without long-
term damage to agricultural productivity. 
A 1997 USDA review of conservation compliance
found 1,674 different conservation systems that
brought erosion to compliance levels had been
approved (Claassen et al., 2000). Conservation systems
involving only conservation cropping sequences, con-
servation tillage, crop residue use, or some combina-
tion of these three practices were applied on 54 per-
cent of HEL cropland (Claassen et al., 2000). Plans
vary widely among regions, based on cropping pat-
terns, production systems, climate, and soils (USDA,
FSA, 2000a).
Targeting has increased environmental benefits of
the CRP. The Conservation Reserve Program was
USDA’s first exercise in environmental targeting in
agri-environmental programs. In 1985, CRP was
designed to enroll highly erodible land to reduce soil
erosion and, perhaps more importantly, to reduce farm
production during a time of low farm incomes.
Improved water quality, wildlife, and air quality were
secondary objectives and played no role in program
qualification. The 1990 farm bill mandated that pro-
gram enrollment be based on a more comprehensive
assessment of potential environmental benefits that
must then be compared with costs. The Environmental
Benefits Index (EBI) was devised to meet this pro-
gram objective. 
The EBI is made up of a number of factors that
account for environmental benefits (e.g., water quality)
and contract costs (the proposed annual rental pay-
ments and cost of practice installment). Some environ-
mental factors are given more points (e.g., water qual-
ity) than others are (e.g., air quality) because their
nonmarket benefits are thought to be larger. The scor-
ing of points for each EBI factor for each field that
farmers offer to enroll is based on features such as soil
type, location, county population, and the proposed
CRP land cover (e.g., multiple grasses, trees, etc.)
(table 4). The factor points a field earns serves as a
proxy for the relative value of the field’s potential
environmental impact. For example, a field located
near surface water receives a higher water quality
score because its sediment, nutrients, and pesticides
are more likely to reach the water. Fields in counties
with large populations also rate a higher score because
there are more people to appreciate (value) the
increase in water quality. 
An early economic analysis of environmental target-
ing indicated that the first EBI substantially increased
environmental benefits relative to costs, compared
with the program’s original, erosion-based design
(Osborn, 1993). This first EBI was based on four
major benefit areas (water quality, wildlife, erosion,
and permanent cover).
A more recent study shows that moving to environ-
mental targeting provided a $370-million/year increase
in CRP benefits with program acreage and costs virtu-
ally unchanged (Feather et al., 1999). This value repre-
sents a lower-bound estimate of the increase in bene-
fits because only three environmental benefits—water-
based recreation, pheasant hunting, and wildlife view-
ing—are included. 
While it is clear that environmental targeting with the
EBI has increased benefits relative to program costs,
recent research indicates two adjustments that would
further this increase. First, points given some EBI fac-
tors could be adjusted to reflect the associated bene-
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tional to the factor benefit estimates would increase
environmental benefits from the CRP. The actual EBI
points earned by acres selected into the CRP in
signups 1997-2000 totaled 1,685 million for wildlife,
1,097 million for water quality, 1,382 million for soil
productivity, and 263 million for air quality. By con-
trast, factor benefits are estimated at $704
million/year for wildlife impacts, $499 million/year
for gains in water quality, $145 million/year for gains
in soil productivity, and $50 million/year for gains in
wind erosion benefits. Thus the estimated annual
water quality and wildlife benefits are approximately
40 percent of their respective total EBI scores. How-
ever, total CRP erosion reduction benefits are only 10
percent of the total EBI points for erosion reduction.
Since 10 percent is one-fourth of 40 percent, the EBI
factor scores for erosion are four times what they
should average if proportional to benefits. Likewise,
the EBI factor score for air quality is approximately
twice what it should be if factor score and benefits are
to be proportional. However, adjusting factor scores is
tenuous because only the erosion factor’s benefit esti-
mate is thought to be nearly comprehensive (Feather
et al., 1999). 
Second, environmental improvements near populated
areas are, in many cases, of higher value than those in
more rural areas because more people are there to
enjoy the improvements. As previously noted, the cur-
rent EBI attempts to incorporate this effect by includ-
ing county populations. However, populations in
neighboring counties are also relevant when impacts to
environmental amenities are local, and populations in
more distant areas are relevant when impacts are
downstream, downwind, or along a migratory route.
Research results indicate that the relative size and dis-
tance of the population surrounding the environmental
improvement and the fate and transport of the environ-
mental resources determine this population effect
(Feather et al., 1999). An accounting of the impact on
the affected population would likely enhance the tar-
geting efficiency of the EBI and the CRP.
While coordination, flexibility, and targeting are three
significant improvements in program design, they are
not likely to be the only way an agri-environmental
policy might be improved. However, these are the
most apparent improvements demonstrated in pro-
grams implemented over the last two decades. 26  Agri-Environmental Policy at the Crossroads / AER-794 Economic Research Service/USDA
Agri-Environmental Payments:
Policy Objectives and 
Program Design
In this section, we take up issues related to the selec-
tion of agri-environmental payment program objectives
and the design of programs to meet these objectives.
We focus on a payment or subsidy program for several
reasons. First, voluntary subsidy mechanisms are the
most widely used agri-environmental policy instru-
ment in agriculture, owing largely to longstanding con-
cern for and support of farm incomes. Second, two
environmental payment programs have recently been
proposed: the Conservation Security Program (CSP)
proposed as a part of the Clinton Administration’s
FY2001 budget proposal, and the Conservation Secu-
rity Act (CSA) introduced by Sen. Tom Harkin (D-IA).
(Our analysis is not based on the specifics of either
proposal.) Third, a payment program that deals with
environmental performance on land in production may
be suitable for addressing agri-environmental problems
not well addressed by traditional land retirement or
cost-share programs, namely nutrient loss to surface
and ground water. Finally, we focus on a payment pro-
gram because little formal analysis has been devoted
to the design of such a program.
We raise a range of issues and analyze each issue con-
ceptually, noting tradeoffs that may arise in develop-
ing a practical agri-environmental payment program.
Ultimately, however, analyzing the effect of policy
design on environmental, farm income, and other pro-
gram outcomes benefits from empirical analysis. To
illustrate some of these tradeoffs, we provide some
empirical results from an analysis of hypothetical pro-
gram scenarios. 
We use two analytic tools for the empirical analysis.
Our first tool, the U.S. Agriculture Sector Mathemati-
cal Programming Model (USMP) (see appendix 2),
allows us to simulate a number of program alterna-
tives. USMP is designed to predict producer response
to policy incentives. Our second tool is a cross-analy-
sis of data from the Agricultural Resources Manage-
ment Survey (ARMS) and environmental indicators
developed from USDA and the U.S. Geological Sur-
vey (USGS) data (see appendix 3). This analysis is
designed to assess the overlap between specific pro-
ducer groups and environmental indicators.
In our simulation modeling, we assume continuation
of current farm programs, as specified by the Federal
Agricultural Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act of
1996: Production Flexibility Contract (PFC) payments
are funded at their 2002 level (roughly $4 billion),
Loan Deficiency Payments (LDP’s) are available in
case of low prices, and the Conservation Reserve Pro-
gram (CRP) is continued at roughly 36 million acres.
We also assume that conservation compliance, sod-
buster, and swampbuster remain in place, but that pro-
ducers are otherwise free to expand (or contract) crop
acreage, consistent with the end of farm program base
acreages and annual set-aside requirements under the
1996 Act. We model changes in commodity prices,
farm income, and other economic variables as changes
from those projected by the 1998 USDA baseline for
the year 2005 (USDA-WOAB, 1998).
Agri-Environmental Payment 
Program Priorities 
Agri-environmental payments could be used to address
a myriad of environmental or farm income purposes.
For example, payment programs may seek to improve
water quality, increase wildlife populations, maintain
soil productivity, and/or support farm incomes. Agri-
cultural policy is now made up of multiple programs
serving varying farm income, environmental, and other
objectives. Because agricultural policy has multiple
objectives, conflicts among objectives inevitably arise,
if for no other reason than limited federal resources
available to address these objectives. However, pro-
gram design or lack of coordination among programs
can also create or unnecessarily intensify tradeoffs
among policy objectives. 
Coordination across the full range of farm pro-
grams can reduce contradictory or duplicate
efforts. The policy context is important to the selec-
tion of agri-environmental payment program objec-
tives. If existing farm income support mechanisms are
continued (e.g., production flexibility contract pay-
ments or loan deficiency payments), it may be appro-
priate to focus agri-environmental payment programs
more heavily on environmental purposes. Likewise, if
existing environmental programs are continued, it may
be appropriate to focus on environmental issues not
addressed by existing programs. For example, if land
retirement programs are continued, policymakers may
want to focus payments on production management or
conservation practices on land in crop production. 
In a multi-objective policy, addressing each objec-
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way, failure to explicitly address each objective can
result in unnecessary tradeoffs among objectives.
Some conflicts arise due to the physical nature of agri-
environmental problems and cannot be avoided. For
example, crop production management practices to
slow rainfall runoff can reduce nitrogen runoff and soil
erosion, but may increase nitrogen leaching into
ground water (USGS, 1999). In other cases, environ-
mental problems may be somewhat complementary,
i.e., addressing one problem also addresses another, at
least partially. For example, because a significant
majority of phosphorus is lost to the surface through
soil erosion (Litke, 1999; Sharpley et al., 1999), ero-
sion reduction can reduce both sediment and nutrient
damage to surface water. In general, however, failing
to address each objective will expose policymakers to
tradeoffs that could be avoided and may produce unin-
tended consequences. 
Some Examples of Likely Tradeoffs
Targeting a specific environmental problem will not
necessarily address other environmental problems
and may make some worse. Even when environmen-
tal objectives are not at odds due to the physical nature
of the environmental problems involved, policies that
focus exclusively on a single environmental objective
may produce unintended consequences that make other
environmental problems worse. 
To illustrate, we analyzed programs designed to reduce
(1) sediment damage to water quality and (2) nitrogen
damage to water quality (see box, “Evaluating Alterna-
tive Environmental Objectives“). Results suggest that
conflict can arise. Directing payments to reduce sedi-
ment damage produces no change in nitrogen lost to
water or excess nitrogen balances at the national level.
By contrast, directing payments to reduce nitrogen
damage increases annual soil erosion by 5.6 million
tons or roughly 0.5 percent. This unintended conse-
quence arises because payments are based on the use
of “low” nitrogen application rates. Although produc-
ers reduce application rates on some acres in produc-
tion, they also expand crop production where it is prof-
itable using the low application rate, given the subsidy.
The potential cures for such unintended consequences
are discussed later in this report.
Tradeoffs can also arise between farm income support
and environmental objectives. Environmental objec-
tives can be achieved through payments for farm
income support only to the extent that environmental
problems occur on farms receiving income support. On
the other hand, income support can be achieved
through environmental payments only to the extent
that farms targeted for income support also create
environmental damages. To illustrate, we consider
agri-environmental indicators related to rainfall ero-
sion, wind erosion, and nitrogen runoff to surface
water (see box, “Defining Farm Income Support 
‘Target’ Groups and Environmental Indicators”). We
assume that two specific groups are targeted for farm
income support based on considerations of farm size
and financial need: “small” farms and “moderately
unprofitable” farms, e.g., farms that are not financially
viable but could be with additional support. More gen-
erally, we look at the overlap between groups defined
in the ERS farm typology (appendix 4) and the agri-
environmental indicators. 
Targeting payments to producers in need of income
support is unlikely to fully address any specific
agri-environmental problem. Directing payments to
farms on the basis of financial or income criteria
means that payments would not reach a large amount
of land with environmental problems. For example,
less than half of all rainfall erosion, wind erosion, and
nitrogen runoff acres are likely to be located on either
a small or moderately unprofitable farm (fig. 4). Of the
three indicators, the proportion of wind erosion
acreage managed by farms we target for income sup-
port in this example is highest, roughly 40 percent for
moderately unprofitable farms and approaching 50
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We use USMP (appendix 2) to compare programs
designed to (1) reduce water quality damage due to sedi-
ment, and (2) reduce water quality damage due to nitrogen
runoff from land in crop production (see table). Nitrogen
runoff can be transported hundreds of miles, particularly
in large rivers. Water quality damage due to nitrogen gen-
erally occurs in the coastal zone.
To focus program activity on regions where soil erosion or
nitrogen runoff causes the largest potential damage to
water quality, producers in those regions can receive
higher payments, commensurate with higher water quality
damages per ton of soil erosion or pound of nitrogen fer-
tilizer application (see appendix 5, figs. 9 and 10). How-
ever, farm income support objectives may imply higher
payment rates. Payment rates are varied by multiplying
the benefit-based payment rate per acre by a constant. As
payment rates increase, total program payments increase.
Reported results are for program payments of $2.1 billion.
Although this figure is arbitrary, it is modest relative to
overall farm program expenditures in recent years. Finally,
to guard against expanding crop production onto highly
erodible land (HEL), producers who bring previously
uncropped HEL into crop production are penalized. This
provision is similar to sodbuster because the penalty is
based on the level of other farm program payments (pri-
marily Production Flexibility Contract (PFC) payments)
and will be referred to as a sodbuster-type penalty. Results
indicate that the sediment damage reduction and nitrogen
damage reduction scenarios are not complementary. Tar-
geting sediment damage exclusively produces no change
in nitrogen fertilizer use or excess nitrogen balances.
However, targeting nitrogen damage exclusively produces
an increase in soil erosion and associated water quality
damages. Because any non-highly erodible land is eligible
for the “low” nitrogen application rate subsidy, producers 
Evaluating Alternative Environmental Objectives
USMP scenarios on alternate environmental objectives
USMP scenario  Environmental objective  Payment base  Payment rate (per acre)1
Sediment damage  Reduce sediment damage  Use of “low rainfall  Soil conserved4 (tons per acre) 
to water quality erosion” production multiplied by estimated water 
systems2 quality damage per ton (see 
appendix 5) 
Nitrogen damage  Reduce nitrogen  Use of “low” Nitrogen application forgone5,
damage to water quality  nitrogen application  multiplied by a value per pound
rates3 of reduced nitrogen application
(see appendix 5)
1 Payment rates are also adjusted by constant multiples of these rates to provide results on a range of program sizes. We report a range of
results because environmental benefits may be underestimated and/or farm income support objectives may imply higher rates.
2 A production system with a rainfall erosion rate below that for a system using a predominant crop rotation in combination with conven-
tional tillage on the same soil and in the same region.
3 A nitrogen application is considered “low” if it is below the average rate for a specific crop rotation, on a specific soil, in a given region. 
4 Difference between (1) the maximum erosion rate observed for any production system for a given soil in a given region (the reference level)
and (2) the estimated rate of erosion for the system in use on the same soil in the same region.
5 Difference between (1) the highest nitrogen application rate observed for a specific crop rotation, on a specific soil, in a given region (the
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percent for small farms. While small farms contain just
over 40 percent of rainfall erosion and nitrogen runoff
acres, only about 30 percent of these acres are likely to
be located on moderately unprofitable farms.
More generally, targeting any group defined by gross
sales or source of household income (farm vs. non-
farm) is unlikely to capture a majority of environmen-
tal problems, unless the criteria are very broadly
defined. No single group defined within the ERS farm
typology accounts for more than 25 percent of any of
our environmental indicator acreages (fig. 5). 
Nationally, targeting multiple environmental prob-
lems makes it likely that most farms targeted for
income support could participate in an agri-envi-
ronmental payments program. In our illustration, 70
percent or more of both moderately unprofitable and
small farms contain acreage susceptible to at least one
of the three indicators (fig. 6), although not all acreage
on these farms would be eligible. Rainfall erosion
acreage occurs on roughly 70 percent of moderately
unprofitable farms and 65 percent of small farms.
Regionally, however, the proportion of small and mod-
erately unprofitable farms that contains at least one of
the three indicator acreages varies widely. More than
95 percent of small farms in the Heartland would qual-
expand crop production using “low” nitrogen application
rates. Erosion is increased, increasing sediment damage
to water quality by $72.2 million. 
The sediment damage scenario directs the largest pay-
ments to the Heartland and Northern Crescent regions
(see figure on previous page). The Heartland benefits
because the program pays for use of production systems
with “low” erosion rates regardless of when these rates
were achieved. The Heartland region contains more than
one-fourth of U.S. cropland acreage and has been the
focus of considerable conservation policy effort (e.g., con-
servation compliance). The Northern Crescent region
receives large payments because the value of reduced soil
erosion is high (fig. 9, p. 34.).
The nitrogen damage scenario directs payments to the
Southern Seaboard, Fruitful Rim, and, to a lesser extent,
the Northern Crescent (see figure). The proportion of
nitrogen applied in agricultural production that ultimately
reaches coastal waters depends greatly on the distance to
the coast or major rivers (see appendix 5). Nearly all of
the U.S. coastline is included in these three regions.
Moreover, nearly all of the 5.6-million ton increase in
rainfall erosion occurs in the Southern Seaboard and
Fruitful Rim. 
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ify for payments while only 34 percent of small farms
in the Eastern Uplands would be eligible (fig. 7). For
moderately unprofitable farms, regional differences are
more widespread. More than 90 percent of these farms
in the Heartland and Northern Crescent regions would
be eligible while less than 40 percent would qualify
for payments in the Eastern Uplands and Fruitful Rim
(fig. 8). 
Nationally, the proportion of small and moderately
unprofitable farms eligible for agri-environmental pay-
ments would almost surely be increased by targeting a
wider range of environmental problems. Whether other
environmental indicators (e.g., potential pesticide
runoff) could significantly increase the proportion of
producers covered in the Eastern Uplands and Fruitful
Rim regions is difficult to predict. However, targeting
multiple environmental problems also means that
significant funding would be directed toward farms
that are not targeted for income support. Given the
high proportion of environmental indicator acreage
outside small and moderately unprofitable farms, sig-
nificant program funding would go to farms not tar-
geted for income support.
A Framework for Considering Tradeoffs
Tailoring a program to meet multiple objectives as
effectively as possible requires that each program
objective be specifically addressed. Doing so requires
a method for prioritizing objectives and devising a 
program to translate those objectives into producer
incentives for program participation.
We use a linkage between Agricultural Resource Man-
agement Survey (ARMS) data and some environmental
indicators (see appendix 3) to estimate the extent of over-
lap between groups of farmers who could be targeted for
farm support and selected environmental indicators. 
Farm Income Objectives. We consider two groups that
could be targeted for farm income support. Our objective
is not to endorse any specific group for income support,
but to illuminate issues that policymakers may face in
designing a multi-objective agri-environmental payment
policy. We also consider the groups defined in the ERS
farm typology (see appendix 4). While the typology
does not define or suggest a farm income target group, it
divides farms into groups that may be useful to policy-
makers in targeting payments or assessing the distribu-
tion of agri-environmental (or other program) payments.
Small farms are farms with gross annual farm income of
$250,000 or less, where farming is considered a primary
occupation for at least one member of the household. The
fate of small farms has concerned policymakers. The
National Commission on Small Farms was created in
1997 to assess the status of small farms and determine
ways USDA could “recognize, respect, and respond to
their needs” (USDA, National Commission on Small
Farms, 1998). 
Moderately unprofitable farms are farms where the full
(economic) costs of production exceed total revenue by
up to 50 percent. These farms are not financially viable
(i.e., revenue does not cover the full economic cost of
production) but are more likely than higher cost farms to
become so through government support payments (More-
hart, Kuhn, and Offutt, 2000). If a policy goal is to keep
farmers in farming, income support may be most helpful
if directed toward moderately unprofitable farms.
Environmental Indicators. Agriculture affects a wide
range of environmental resources (e.g., water quality),
which provide many environmental amenities (e.g.,
water-based recreation). Many agri-environmental indica-
tors could be used to determine eligibility for agri-envi-
ronmental payments. For illustrative purposes, we con-
sider three indicators:
 Rainfall erosion acreage—non-highly erodible crop-
land with rainfall erosion rates greater than the soil
loss tolerance (T); 
 Wind erosion acreage—non-highly erodible cropland
with wind erosion rates greater than the soil loss toler-
ance (T); 
 Nitrogen runoff acreage—cropland acreage where
nitrogen runoff to surface water is estimated to exceed
1,000 kg/km2/year. 
Non-highly erodible cropland is considered here because
it is not already subject to conservation compliance
requirements, as is highly erodible land. The level of
nitrogen runoff designated at “high” is arbitrary but is a
level classified as high by Smith et al. (1997).
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In theory, agri-environmental problems can be priori-
tized on the basis of net economic benefits, i.e., the
benefit of increasing environmental quality less the
costs of making these improvements. Economic bene-
fits flow from an increase in the quality of nonmarketed
goods and services that depend on environmental qual-
ity; they are an estimate of the dollar value society
places on improvements in such activities as boating,
fishing, hunting, or wildlife viewing. Costs include the
public and private costs of changing farm production
management and conservation practices to obtain these
improvements. Society gains when environmental ben-
efits exceed the cost of producing those benefits.
If farm income is of concern, policymakers can assign
a level of priority to farm income support. Then pro-
gram funds can be allocated among environmental and
farm income purposes in a way that maximizes the
sum of net environmental benefits and gains due to
farm income support. 
The reality is considerably more complex. The non-
market benefits of environmental improvements can be
difficult to measure, improvements in environmental
amenities can be difficult to link to specific changes in
production management and conservation practices on
a specific farm, and the cost of changing specific prac-
tices on specific farms is uncertain. 
Nonetheless, a simplified version of the benefit-cost
framework can be useful for program implementation.
For example, policymakers or program designers can
establish weights to account for (1) the relative size of
potential benefits from specific environmental ameni-
ties and (2) the likelihood that a specific action, taken
on a specific field, will increase the environmental
amenity by a given amount. These weights can be
derived from a variety of sources, including formal
valuation studies, studies of physical links between
agricultural production and resource quality, and
expert opinion. A similar approach has been used, with
some success, for targeting in the CRP. 
Agri-Environmental Payment 
Program Design
Assuming that program budgets are limited, how can a
program be best designed to make available funds go
as far as possible toward achieving environmental and
farm income objectives? For simplicity, we focus
explicitly on maximizing environmental gains.
Nonetheless, we note farm income implications of pol-
icy options and structure our empirical analysis around
program designs that would have a relatively large
farm income effect. Specifically, payments are
designed to exceed the cost of environmental actions
that trigger payment for at least some producers on
some land. We also consider equity as it relates to
whether so-called “good actors”—producers who have
already attained a relatively high level of environmen-
tal performance or adopted good production manage-
ment or conservation practices—would qualify for
payments under various program designs.
Our review of past and present agri-environmental pro-
grams suggests that the net environmental benefits of a
program can be enhanced by 
 spatial targeting, directing payments to would-be
program participants who can achieve the largest
environmental gains relative to costs; and
 producer flexibility, giving farmers the flexibility
to select the lowest cost method of improving envi-
ronmental performance in specific resource and
management settings. 
In this section, we expand our discussion to consider
 environmental effectiveness, or program design
features that pay for changes in production manage-
ment or conservation practice that most directly
address environmental objectives; 
 information that will be needed to implement a
given program design; and 
 administrative costs such as conservation planning,
technical assistance, enforcement, and other costs
that may be required to deliver the program. 
Finally, a critical point of our analysis will be to iden-
tify the potential for unintended consequences and
to suggest ways to minimize them. 
Some Program Design Options
Key program design choices are encompassed in three
major issues: How much is paid to whom for taking
what action on what land? 
What Action? The action that triggers payment is
often referred to as the payment base. Choice of a
payment base can be considered in two dimensions
(table 6). First, payments can be based on environmen-
tal performance or on the use of specific production
management or conservation practices. For example,
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formance-based payment) or for using soil-conserving
practices such as conservation tillage, contour farming,
or terraces (a practice- or design-based payment).
Agri-environmental payments cannot be based on
actual environmental performance, such as nutrient
runoff or soil erosion, because actual performance can-
not be monitored at a reasonable cost and often varies
with the weather or other factors outside the pro-
ducer’s control (Braden and Segerson, 1993; Shortle
and Abler, 1994; Shortle and Dunn, 1986). However,
average or expected environmental performance can
sometimes be estimated using physical process models
like Universal Soil Loss Equation (USLE) or the Wind
Erosion Equation (WEE). From here forward, we use
the term “environmental performance” to refer to
application of a set of production management or con-
servation practices that results in a specific level of
estimated environmental performance. 
A second dimension of the payment base decision
refers to the timing of and reason for a farmer’s
change in environmental performance or related pro-
duction management or conservation practices. Pay-
ments might go to those who improve environmental
performance or adopt specified practices after enact-
ment of the program. In other words, producers would
not be paid for production management or conserva-
tion practices previously adopted. 
Alternately, payments may be extended on the basis of
“good” environmental performance or the use of
“good” production management or conservation prac-
tices, regardless of when or why good performance
was attained or good practices were adopted. In other
words, all “good actors” would be eligible for pay-
ments. To implement such a program, good perform-
ance or good practices must be defined. For example,
good performance could be tied to a specific threshold
of estimated soil erosion or nutrient runoff. Good
practices could be defined as use of conservation
tillage, nutrient management, or other production man-
agement or conservation practices.
What Land? If producers choose to expand crop pro-
duction, will the additional land be eligible for agri-
environmental payments? Will producers be penalized
in some way for converting environmentally sensitive
land, such as HEL or wetland, from noncrop uses to
crop production? In other words, will sodbuster- or
swampbuster-type provisions apply to these payments?
This question is particularly relevant to payments
based on good performance or good practices because
these payment bases do not explicitly require environ-
mental improvement, as does the improve performance
payment base. Good performance, for example, does
not depend on past land use. If previously uncropped
land is eligible for the agri-environmental subsidy, it
could encourage producers to expand crop production
with negative consequences to the environment.
Improved performance, on the other hand, does
depend on past land use and, thus, will not encourage
producers to expand crop production. 
How Much? To Whom? In a voluntary program, pro-
ducers will participate only if the payment offered cov-
ers the cost of changing production management or
conservation practices as required by the program. On
the other hand, payments larger than the value of the
environmental benefit produced by the change in pro-
duction management or conservation practices (to the
extent this is known) need to be justified on grounds of
other program objectives (e.g., farm income support).
We consider three cases. First, policymakers could set
payments that approximate the social benefit of envi-
ronmental gains. Second, payments could be based on
producer cost of participation. Because information on
benefits and costs is limited, these cases cannot be fully
achieved in practice. However, they are quite instruc-
tive. A third option is to establish payments, based on
Table 6—Summary of payment base options for an agri-environmental payments program
Improve Performance Pay for adoption of production systems that 
improve environmental performance
Practices Pay for adoption of "good" conservation or 
production practices
Good Performance Pay for use of production systems that produce 
"good" environmental performance
Practices Pay for use of "good" conservation or production 
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environmental actions, at levels that could support farm
income. Thus, payments would exceed producers’
costs, for at least some producers on some land.
Benefit-level payments. First, we consider the case
where producer payments attempt to approximate the
environmental benefit that flows from subsidized
changes in conservation and management practices.
This approach can provide direct income support to
producers because payments can exceed the producer’s
cost of changing production management or conserva-
tion practices. In a sense, producers can earn profit
from the “sale” of environmental goods and services.
Subsidy rates effectively serve as “prices” for these
environmental goods, inducing producers to allocate
additional effort to producing them. If production
declines because of the program, indirect farm income
support may also result from higher commodity prices. 
If payments vary spatially with the variation in
expected environmental benefits (see appendix 5; figs.
9 and 10), spatial targeting is accomplished through
producer self-selection. Producers who can achieve
large environmental gains (i.e., are located in areas
where the value of improved environmental quality is
large) at a relatively low cost have the largest incentive
to participate. Producers who can achieve only small
environmental gains or can achieve gains only at a
high cost will have less incentive to participate.
If benefit-level payments are based on good perform-
ance or use of good practices, policy decisionmakers
will also have to decide how much environmental
“improvement” or practice “change” will be credited
to “good actors.” For example, if a program seeks to
conserve soil (to reduce water quality damage due to
sediment, for example), how much soil conservation
will be credited to a producer who has already
achieved relatively low soil erosion rates?
One way to determine payment credit is to establish a
reference level of environmental performance or prac-
tice use. Consider subsidies for soil conservation. The
soil conservation credit assigned to a production sys-
tem (that qualifies as good performance) could be
calculated as the difference between the reference
erosion rate and the estimated erosion rate for the








Estimated water quality damage from soil erosion
Figure 9Economic Research Service/USDA Agri-Environmental Policy at the Crossroads / AER-794  35
system could be the soil conservation credit (in tons)
multiplied by the (dollar) value per ton of soil con-
served. (Note that the reference level need not be the
threshold used to determine which systems qualify as
good performance.)
Reference levels could vary with soil type and topogra-
phy, geographic region, or all these factors. While a ref-
erence level is not an environmental baseline—it would
not be specific to a particular farm or field—it would
reflect the cropping patterns and production manage-
ment or conservation practices generally in place under
homogeneous soil and climate conditions. 
Reference levels will be a direct determinant of pay-
ment rates. If the reference level reflects poor environ-
mental performance for a specific soil and region, soil
conservation credits to “low erosion” production sys-
tems would be large. Alternately, if producers are cred-
ited only with gains beyond a typical or predominant
level of environmental performance, credits and pay-
ments will be smaller. Clearly, a wide range of refer-
ence levels and associated rationale are possible.
Finally, program size (total government expenditure
for producer payments) would ultimately be deter-
mined by producer participation, much as in past com-
modity programs. Participation would depend largely
on the subsidy rates offered to producers. Policymak-
ers could attempt to adjust program size by adjusting
one or more of the variables (e.g., the reference level
or the payment rate (dollars per ton of soil conserved))
that go into determining the per-acre payment rate for
specific systems, in much the same way past commod-
ity programs were adjusted. However, such adjust-
ments may result in only imprecise control over total
program size.
Cost-level payments. If payments are to approximate
the cost of making changes in production management
or conservation practices, a different set of issues
arises. Because payments are designed to more closely
approximate costs than benefits, there will be less
direct income support under this type of a program.
However, producer incomes may still rise if commod-
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Because farm-specific costs are unknown, cost infor-
mation must be gotten from farmers. Requiring farmers
to produce receipts for purchases would work for
changes involving large one-time expenditures (e.g., for
building a terrace), but may fail to capture the costs of
less concrete changes (e.g., reduced yields or increased
labor). Or producers could submit bids describing pro-
posed actions and a proposed level of payment. If the
bid process is well designed, bids will represent the
lowest payment the bidder is willing to accept for tak-
ing the proposed action. These bids may approach pro-
ducers’costs in very competitive situations.
Moreover, spatial targeting does not happen by pro-
ducer self-selection under cost-level payments. To tar-
get producers who can achieve high net benefits, bid
acceptance can be based on producer bids and an esti-
mate of potential environmental benefits. In the CRP,
for example, producer bids for rental payments are
considered together with EBI scores to determine
which contracts will be accepted (see table 4). Target-
ing is achieved because producers who exhibit high
environmental scores relative to their participation
costs are more likely to have their bids accepted. 
Finally, policymakers can control program costs by
deciding how many proposed agri-environmental pay-
ment contracts to accept. By adjusting the acceptance
criteria once bids are received but before they are
accepted or rejected, policymakers may gain some
additional measure of control over program expendi-
tures with a cost-level payment approach.
Farm income support-level payments. Payments
would be based on agri-environmental actions, as in
the benefit-level or cost-level payments. However, the
level of payment would depend on the level of income
support policymakers want to extend to agricultural
producers. Actual income support to producers would
depend on the level of payments, producer participa-
tion costs, and income gain or loss due to commodity
price changes. 
Analysis of Alternative Program Designs
To illustrate the consequences of some program
design choices, we focus on a limited number of pro-
gram designs. This approach is necessary because
some program features interact so that individual fea-
tures cannot be adequately analyzed apart from over-
all program design. 
Our comparison of program designs is organized
around the question of payment base. Payment rates
consider both environmental benefits and farm income
considerations. Thus, farm income is supported
directly. Payment rates recognize spatial variation in
potential benefits (see figs. 9 and 10, appendix 5), so
spatial targeting is achieved through producer self-
selection. Payment rates are also varied (by multiply-
ing all payments rates by a constant) to reflect the pos-
sibility that a larger program may be desirable on the
basis of farm income considerations. 
For the good performance and good practices payment
bases, non-HEL that was not previously cropped is eli-
gible for agri-environmental payments if it is con-
verted to crop production using good practices or pro-
duction systems that meet the definition of good per-
formance. However, producers who bring previously
uncropped HEL into crop production are penalized.
This provision is similar to sodbuster because the
penalty is based on the level of other farm program
payments (primarily Production Flexibility Contract
(PFC) payments) and will be referred to as a sodbuster
provision in the subsequent discussion.
We discuss and demonstrate the potential for unintended
consequences in several ways. In one case, we relax the
sodbuster provision. In another case, we compare a spa-
tially targeted scenario (i.e., where the value per ton of
soil conserved varies with potential benefits) with one
where the value per ton of soil conserved is uniform
across the country. These comparisons help illustrate
how high payment rates in specific regions can encour-
age expansion of crop production and, potentially, undo
the beneficial effects of spatial targeting.
Paying producers on the basis of improved environ-
mental performance ensures that payments leverage
environmentally effective actions, minimize producer
participation costs, and minimize the risk of unin-
tended consequences. First, payments are effective in
Paying producers on the basis of
improved environmental performance
ensures that payments leverage environ-
mentally effective actions, minimize pro-
ducer participation costs, and minimize
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furthering the program’s environmental objectives
because they are based on production management
and conservation practice changes that directly
improve environmental performance, adding to envi-
ronmental quality. Second, performance-based pay-
ments are flexible for producers, allowing them to
select low-cost methods of achieving environmental
gains. Finally, the risk of unintended consequences
due to cropland expansion is minimized because pro-
ducers must improve overall performance on the
entire farm. For example, bringing hay or pasture land
into crop production would almost surely reduce envi-
ronmental performance and would count against the
producer in determining an overall level of environ-
mental performance.
However, payments based on improved performance
also require USDA to have a great deal of information,
may entail high costs for planning and enforcement,
and may be viewed as inequitable by some producers.
First, a farm-level or field-specific baseline of past pro-
duction management and conservation practices will be
needed to assess the change in performance. Depending
on the environmental performance measure sought,
extensive data on past land use, crop rotations, input
use (e.g., fertilizer application rates), and cropping
practices (e.g., tillage systems) will be needed. Such
baseline information is not widely available. Collecting
baseline information after enactment of an agri-envi-
ronmental payment program would invite gaming: pro-
ducers could temporarily abandon some environmen-
tally favorable practices to obtain a more favorable
baseline. Second, basing payments on estimated envi-
ronmental performance may entail significant planning
and enforcement costs. To date, only the USLE and
WEE models have been used in program implementa-
tion. Other models for estimating other physical
processes (e.g., nutrient runoff) are more complex,
requiring more user training and more data for success-
ful implementation. Finally, paying for improvement in
environmental performance excludes past gains by
“good actors.” These producers may argue that past
gains entitle them to the same payments received by
producers who improved environmental performance
only in response to agri-environmental payments. 
Paying for “good” environmental performance
requires no baseline information and treats “good
actors” equally with other producers. Significant
environmental effectiveness and producer flexibility
are maintained, but payments are less effective and
less flexible than in the improve performance sce-
nario. This approach may also result in significant
unintended consequences. 
Payments based on good environmental performance
are less effective environmentally and less flexible
than payments based on improved performance
because some options for improving environmental
performance are precluded. In some cases, for exam-
ple, the best way to improve environmental perform-
ance will be to retire land from crop production. The
good performance payment base does not subsidize
land retirement (to subsidize land not in crop produc-
tion, simply because it is not in crop production,
would be quite expensive). In this case, coordination
between land retirement and agri-environmental pay-
ments may be important to ensure that gains from land
retirement are realized and that the more appropriate
instrument is used case-by-case. An agri-environmen-
tal payment program with broader objectives could
also provide payments for good grazing management
that would provide some incentive for returning land
to, or retaining land in, grazing. 
Moreover, if payments are limited to production sys-
tems with good performance, some more modest con-
servation strategies that do not attain the “good per-
formance” standard (e.g., giving up a moldboard plow
for conventional tillage) would be excluded from the
subsidy program. If the focus of the program is on mit-
igation of offsite damages, any improvement in onfarm
environmental performance is useful. Still, there may
be legitimate objections to extending agri-environmen-
tal payments to producers who do not meet some mini-
mum standard of environmental performance. If “bad
actors” receive subsidies for modest environmental
improvement while “good actors”—with much better
environmental performance—are excluded, producers
will be discouraged from taking any unsubsidized
action that improves environmental performance.
Payments based on improved 
performance require USDA to have a
great deal of information, may entail
high costs for planning and enforcement,
and may be viewed as inequitable by
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Our empirical analysis illustrates how differences in
environmental effectiveness and producer flexibility
affect environmental outcomes in the improve perform-
ance and good performance scenarios (see box, “Pay-
ment Bases and Program Performance”). These sce-
narios are directed toward soil conservation and tar-
geted to reduce sediment damage to water quality. 
Differences in erosion reduction per dollar of program
payment between the improve performance and good
performance scenarios are quite large. At $1 billion in
producer payments, the improve performance scenario
reduces soil erosion by roughly 110 million tons, just
under 15 percent. By contrast, the good performance and
good practices scenarios produce only 20 million and 22
million tons of erosion reduction. Moreover, as the level
of producer payments rises (as the result of raising pay-
ment rates per ton of soil erosion reduced or soil con-
served), the level of erosion reduction increases rapidly
for the improve performance scenario but only slightly
for good performance and good practices scenarios. 
There are several reasons for the difference in erosion
reduction per dollar of program payments. First, much
of the additional money in the good performance and
good practices scenarios goes to increasingly large pay-
ments to “good actors.” Very little of the additional pro-
gram funds leverage new conservation effort. A second
reason for this large difference in performance is the
effect of alternate designs on land use. In the improve
performance scenario, when annual producer payments
are $1 billion, total land in crop production declines
nearly 8 million acres. In the good performance sce-
nario, crop acreage increases by 500,000 acres. Basing
payments on improved performance is unlikely to be
practical given information requirements. However, this
comparison does suggest that there could be advantages
to using good performance or good practices programs
in conjunction with a land retirement program. 
The cropland expansion effect in the good perform-
ance scenario results from unintended incentives to
expand crop production. Subsidizing the expansion of
environmentally good crop production systems or spe-
cific practices will not ensure that these systems are
expanded on cropland where environmentally damag-
ing production systems are being used. Without proper
safeguards, subsidies could prompt producers to con-
vert hay or pasture land to crop production, possibly
increasing—rather than reducing—environmental
damage (Malik and Shoemaker, 1993). 
In the absence of a sodbuster provision, our empirical
analysis (see box, “‘Good Performance’ and Unin-
tended Consequences”) indicates cropland expansion
can severely undercut environmental gains. Without
sodbuster, a program that subsidizes good performance
on soil conservation (the use of “low erosion” produc-
tion systems) can actually increase total soil erosion.
Because the program has a very modest effect on com-
modity prices, cropland acreage expansion and erosion
increases are due almost entirely to subsidy response.
Cropland expansion can also undercut efforts to
increase water quality benefits by offering relatively
high payments to producers in areas or regions where
the water quality benefits of erosion reduction are
high. Even with a sodbuster provision, subsidies can
encourage expansion of crop production on non-highly
erodible land. When payments are varied to reflect
variations in potential benefits, the cropland expansion
effect can be particularly severe in regions where pay-
ments are high. 
When payments are based on good performance,
empirical analysis suggests that water quality benefits
due to sediment reduction can be larger when pay-
ments per ton of soil conserved do not vary spatially
to reflect potential benefits. High payments in high-
benefit regions intensify incentives to expand crop pro-
duction on non-highly erodible land, undercutting the
increase in soil conservation effort on previously exist-
ing cropland.
By contrast, when payments are based on improved
performance, varying payments to reflect variation in
potential benefits does increase water quality benefits.
Producers can receive payments only in exchange for
erosion reduction. In this context, varying payments to
reflect variation in potential benefits intensifies efforts
Paying for “good” environmental per-
formance requires no baseline informa-
tion and treats “good actors” equally
with other producers. Significant envi-
ronmental effectiveness and producer
flexibility are maintained, but payments
are less effective and less flexible than
in the improve performance scenario.
This approach may also result in signifi-
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for environmental improvement because payments
subsidize only those actions that result in environmen-
tal improvement.
These empirical results do not imply that payments
based on good performance cannot be successfully tar-
geted to increase environmental benefits. However,
agri-environmental payment programs that induce pro-
ducers to increase cropland acreage—even on land that
is not highly erodible—can erase environmental gains
on existing cropland. Policymakers may want to con-
sider land-use safeguards that go beyond a sodbuster
provision. It may be useful to limit eligibility for agri-
environmental payments to land already in crop pro-
duction, as closely as that can be determined. A more
aggressive solution would be to expand sodbuster to
cover non-HEL, requiring strict conservation and envi-
ronmental compliance on any additional land brought
into crop production after enactment of the agri-envi-
ronmental payment program. Also, a broader program,
which included payments for good performance or the
use of good practices on grazing land or other non-
cropland, could reduce the incentive to shift land into
crop production.
Paying for use of specific practices can mean low
planning and enforcement costs and low information
requirements, and will ensure that early adopters are
treated equitably. However, this approach eliminates
producer flexibility and may not be environmentally
effective in some resource settings.
A key difference between payments based on good
performance and good practices is the level of envi-
ronmental effectiveness and producer flexibility. Our
empirical analysis shows that the good performance
scenario produces more erosion reduction and water
quality benefit than the good practice scenario per dol-
lar of measured net cost to the economy (for defini-
tion see box, “Payment Bases and Program Perfor-
mance”). However, this analysis could not measure the
planning and enforcement costs associated with a per-
formance-based payment. The greatest advantage of a
good practices payment base is its potential for low
planning and enforcement costs. For example, if pro-
ducers are paid to adopt conservation tillage, planning
and enforcement are straightforward: 30 percent of
the soil surface must be covered with crop residue
after planting. Implementation would require limited
planning, and compliance is readily measurable. While
no specific conclusion can be drawn from our empiri-
cal example, it is generally important to consider both
potential savings due to flexibility and program imple-
mentation costs in selecting a program payment base.
Paying for adoption of a specific practice can mean low
planning and enforcement costs. However, producer
flexibility is eliminated, environmental effectiveness
may be low in some resource settings, and baseline
information will be required. Producers who have
already adopted a given practice or cannot easily use the
favored practice may view this approach as inequitable.
These issues have been discussed at length in the pre-
ceding discussion and will not be repeated here.
Who Pays? Who Gains? 
The choice of payment base will largely determine who
reaps economic gain and who suffers loss due to an
agri-environmental payment program. The distribution
of gains and losses among producers15, consumers, and
taxpayers and among different producers depends on
(1) how payments are distributed among producers, (2)
the cost producers incur in changing production man-
agement or conservation practices to earn payments,
(3) how these costs translate into commodity output
and price changes, and (4) how price changes affect
farm income and consumer welfare. On a conceptual
basis, little can be said about the distribution of cost
and benefits. This section focuses on empirical analy-
sis, with specifications exactly as reported in the box,
“Payment Bases and Program Performance.”
In the improve performance scenario, producers must
reduce erosion to receive payments. In many cases,
Paying for use of specific practices can
mean low planning and enforcement
costs and low information 
requirements, and will ensure that early 
adopters are treated equitably. 
However, this approach eliminates 
producer flexibility and may not be envi-
ronmentally effective in some resource
settings.
15 Our analysis cannot distinguish returns to farmers versus returns
to landowners. When farmers are not landowners, support may
accrue to landowners (see box “Supporting Farm Incomes and Pro-
tecting the Environment: The Case Where Farmers Are Not
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We use USMP (see appendix 2) to analyze the relative
efficiency of achieving environmental gains using three
alternative payment bases, or approaches to defining the
action(s) that will trigger agri-environmental payments:
improve performance, good performance, and use of
good practices. 
In our hypothetical scenarios, the policy objective is to
reduce water quality damage due to sediment. At the farm
level, soil conservation is the focus of the payment base
alternatives (see table). To focus program activity on
regions where soil erosion causes the largest potential dam-
age to water quality, producers in those regions can receive
higher payments, commensurate with higher water quality
damages per ton of soil erosion (see appendix 5 and fig. 9).
However, farm income support objectives may imply
higher payment rates. Payment rates are varied by multiply-
ing the benefit-based payment rate per acre by a constant.
As payment rates increase, total program payments
increase. Finally, to guard against expanding crop produc-
tion onto highly erodible land (HEL), producers who bring
previously uncropped HEL into crop production lose other
farm program benefits. This provision is similar to the sod-
buster provisions of current farm commodity policy and is
referred to as a sodbuster-type penalty.
Producer payments are the government expenditure for
payments to producers, excluding conservation planning,
technical assistance, and enforcement costs. Measured
cost reflects the change in total income in the economy
required to produce the agri-environmental gains due to
the subsidy program, including the direct cost of chang-
ing production management or conservation practices to
achieve environmental gains and indirect costs such as
the loss of commodity output if producers shift to less
erosive but less productive production systems. The
measured costs reported here do not include (1) pay-
ments to producers, (2) government expenditures for pro-
gram implementation, and (3) economic costs of raising
taxes to fund government program expenditures.1 Pro-
ducer payments are not included because they are trans-
fers of income from taxpayers to agricultural producers
rather than actual costs to the overall economy. Govern-
ment expenditures for program implementation and the
economic cost of taxation are real costs of achieving
environmental gains but could not be accounted for in
our modeling framework. Thus, differences in measured
costs must be considered against the potential for differ-
ences in costs not accounted for. 
The improve performance scenario produces much
greater erosion reduction per dollar of program payment
and per dollar of measured cost to the economy than
either the good performance or good practice scenarios.
Payment Bases and Program Performance
Payment bases and payment rates for reducing sediment damage to water quality
USMP scenario Payment base  Payment rate (per acre)1
Improve performance Reduce erosion from pre-program  Erosion reduction (tons per acre) 
baseline  multiplied by estimated water quality
damage per ton (see appendix 5)
Good performance  Use of “low rainfall erosion” Soil conserved4 (tons per acre) 
production systems2 multiplied by estimated water quality
damage per ton (see appendix 5)
Good practices Use of “conservation tillage” Soil conserved4 (tons per acre) 
production systems3 multiplied by estimated water quality
damage per ton (see appendix 5) 
1 Payment rates are also adjusted by constant multiples of these rates to provide results on a range of program sizes. We report a
range of results because environmental benefits may be underestimated and/or farm income support objectives may imply higher
rates.  2 A production system with a rainfall erosion rate below that for a system using a predominant crop rotation in combination
with conventional tillage on the same soil and in the same region.  3 Any tillage system that covers 30 percent or more of the soil
surface with crop residue, after planting, to reduce erosion by water.  4 Difference between (1) the maximum erosion rate observed
for any production system for a given soil in a given region (the reference level) and (2) the estimated rate of erosion for the system
in use on the same soil in the same region.
1 The economic cost of taxation is the value of economic
activity lost due to the tax. Taxes on productive resources will
reduce the utilization of those resources. For example, an
increase in the tax on labor income may prompt some workers
to leave the workforce, reducing production. While the magni-
tude of these costs is unknown, reasonable estimates range
from 20 to 50 cents for each dollar of additional tax revenue
(Browning, 1987).
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At $1 billion in producer payments, the improve perform-
ance scenario reduces soil erosion by roughly 110 mil-
lion tons, just under 15 percent. By contrast, the good
performance and good practice scenarios produce only
20 million and 22 million tons of erosion reduction. For
$250 million in measured cost, the improve performance
scenario produces more than 100 million tons of erosion
reduction, compared with 37 million tons in the good
performance and 30 million tons in the good practices
scenarios. Similar results are obtained with respect to
water quality benefits. 
As the level of producer payments rises, these differences
rapidly become larger. Erosion reduction ranges from just
2 to 5 percent in the good performance and good prac-
tices scenarios as producer payments range from $1 bil-
lion to $4 billion. Much of the additional money
expended in these scenarios goes to increasingly large
payments to “good actors.” Very little of the additional
program funds leverage new conservation effort.
However, information for a pre-program baseline is not
likely to be available and equity concerns may require
that “good actors” be eligible for payment. Then agri-
environmental payments must be based on current pro-
ducer actions without regard to past actions, e.g., good
performance or good practices. Per dollar of measured
costs, the good performance payment base delivers
greater erosion reduction and water quality benefits than
do payments for good practice. However, program
administration costs may be significantly higher for the
good performance scenario due to (1) the effort needed
to develop farm- or field-specific conservation plans and
(2) the complexity of enforcement when every farm or
field has a unique plan. When these costs are considered,
the good practice scenario may well be more cost-effec-
tive in achieving environmental gains. 
On the other hand, per dollar of producer payments, the
good practices scenario produces more erosion reduction
(for producer payments of up to $2.7 billion) and more
water quality benefit over the full range of program sizes
investigated. In general, there is no reason that erosion
reduction or water quality benefits per dollar of payment
under these scenarios should have any specific relation-
ship, since payments are not based on erosion reduction
(as they are in the improve performance scenario). The
good practice scenario compares favorably with the good
performance scenario in terms of producer payments for
two reasons. First, the practice subsidized—conservation
tillage—is well adapted in regions where potential water
quality benefits (and therefore payments) are high. This is
particularly true in the Northern Crescent region. Second,
because conservation tillage is not as widely used as some
other conservation practices, relatively few funds are used
for payment of erosion credits due to past actions.
Finally, the analysis presented here was designed to illus-
trate program design issues and cannot be construed as a
cost-benefit analysis. The water quality benefits we
measure exceed the costs we measure for the improve
performance scenario but fall short of measured costs for
the good performance and good practices scenarios.
However, some benefits of soil erosion reduction (e.g.,
maintenance of soil productivity) and some costs (e.g.,
conservation planning, technical assistance, and enforce-
ment) are not measured. Moreover, we have no estimate
of the value of farm income support, although farm
income support legislation in recent years indicates that
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We use USMP to demonstrate the potential for expanded
crop production under a good performance base. Similar
criticisms may apply to good practices bases for agri-
environmental payment programs. Safeguards against
expansion of crop production can include sodbuster-type
provisions or program “base” acreage provisions (or eli-
gibility criterion) similar to those of previous farm com-
modity programs. Programs that provide payments on
grazing land or other noncropland may also be effective
if the profitability of that acreage rises due to the agri-
environmental payment program. 
In our hypothetical scenarios, the policy objective is to
reduce water quality damage due to sediment. At the farm
level, soil conservation is the focus of the program alterna-
tives. The scenarios analyzed here include two payment
bases: improve performance and good performance (see
table). To focus program activity on regions where soil
erosion causes the largest potential damage to water qual-
ity, producers in those regions can receive higher pay-
ments, commensurate with higher water quality damages
per ton of soil erosion (see appendix 5 and fig. 9). How-
ever, farm income support objectives may imply higher
payment rates. Payment rates are varied by multiplying the
benefit-based payment rate per acre by a constant. As pay-
ment rates increase, total program payments increase. 
Finally, to guard against expanding crop production
onto highly erodible land (HEL), producers who bring
previously uncropped HEL into crop production lose
other farm program benefits. This provision is similar to
the sodbuster provisions of current farm commodity
policy and is referred to as a sodbuster-type penalty. We
also estimate good performance scenarios in which (1)
payments per ton of soil conserved are uniform across
the Nation (not targeted), and (2) the sodbuster penalty
is dropped. 
First, we compare erosion reduction in the good perform-
ance scenario, with and without the sodbuster provision.
Without sodbuster, previously uncropped HEL land is eli-
gible for subsidy payments. Crop production expands
significantly onto uncropped HEL, resulting in a net
increase in soil erosion. Even with the sodbuster provi-
sion non-highly erodible land can be brought into crop
production and receive agri-environmental payments.
“Good Performance” and Unintended Consequences
Payment bases and payment rates for reducing sediment damage to water quality
USMP scenario Payment base  Payment rate (per acre)1
Good performance Use of “low rainfall erosion” Soil conserved3 (tons per acre) 
production systems2 multiplied by estimated water quality
damage per ton (see appendix 5)
Good performance: Use of “low rainfall erosion” Soil conserved3 (tons per acre) 
No Sodbuster  production systems2 multiplied by estimated water quality 
damage per ton (see appendix 5) 
Good performance: Use of “low rainfall erosion” Soil conserved3 (tons per acre) 
Not Targeted production systems2 multiplied by nationally uniform 
rate per ton
Improve performance Reduce erosion from pre-program  Erosion reduction (tons per acre)
baseline  multiplied by estimated water quality 
damage per ton (see appendix 5)
Improve performance: Reduce erosion from pre-program  Erosion reduction (tons per acre) 
Not Targeted baseline  multiplied by nationally uniform 
rate per ton 
1 Payment rates are also adjusted by constant multiples of these rates to provide results on a range of program sizes. We report a range
of results because environmental benefits may be underestimated and/or farm income support objectives may imply higher rates.
2 A production system with a rainfall erosion rate below that for a system using a predominant crop rotation in combination with
conventional tillage on the same soil and in the same region.
3 Difference between (1) the maximum erosion rate observed for any production system for a given soil in a given region (the refer-
ence level) and (2) the estimated rate of erosion for the system in use on the same soil in the same region.
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This cropland expansion effect also limits the environ-
mental performance of good performance programs,
although not as much as expanding crop production on
HEL. The consequences of bringing non-HEL into pro-
duction can best be seen by comparing scenarios in
which payments per ton of soil erosion vary with poten-
tial benefits (targeted) and where this payment is uniform
across the Nation (nontargeted). Targeting is designed to
redirect conservation effort from low-cost/low-benefit
erosion reductions to higher cost/higher benefit reduc-
tions. Targeting results in less erosion reduction but, pre-
sumably, more water quality benefits. 
For the improve performance scenarios, targeting pro-
duces greater water quality benefits per dollar of pro-
ducer payments. For example, at roughly $1 billion in
producer payments, targeting produces roughly $550 
million in water quality benefits, a 32-percent increase
over the nontargeted scenario ($375 million). However,
erosion reduction is less in the targeted scenario because
targeting redirects program funds away from low-
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Improved performance vs. good performance: 
Producer payments and water quality benefits
Producer payments ($ mil.)
Water quality benefit ($ mil.)
Good performance: Not targeted
Improve performance: Not targeted
Improve performance: Targeted
Good performance: Targeted
Regional changes due to targeting in the low erosion systems scenario 
Change from nontargeted to targeted scenario:
Farm resource region Payment  Water quality benefit  Crop acreage  
$ Million  $ Million  Million acres 
Northern Crescent  282.7  4.1  0.5 
Southern Seaboard  30.9  -0.7  0.7 
Mississippi Portal  14.4  0.3  0.2 
Fruitful Rim 9.0  -0.8  0.1 
Eastern Uplands  1.7  0.0  0.0 
Basin and Range  -6.2  -0.3  -0.3 
Prairie Gateway -60.0  -1.4  0.1 
Northern Great Plains  -79.6  -2.9  0.0 
Heartland -171.0  -2.4  -0.1 
U.S. Total  21.9  -4.1  1.2 
1 Benefits associated with reductions in water erosion including water-based recreation benefits, municipal water cleaning, indus-
trial impacts, shipping, water storage, etc.
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producers opt for less productive (but less erosive)
production systems, reducing commodity output and
increasing commodity prices. Consumer welfare is
reduced due to higher commodity prices (fig. 11). The
increase in overall farm income exceeds producer pay-
ments because of higher commodity prices, although
producer gains are offset to some extent by the costs of
erosion reduction. The incomes of livestock producers
fall modestly due to higher feed grain prices. 
In the good performance and good practices options,
producers can receive payments based on past actions,
so the increase in conservation practices is lower for a
given level of producer payments. Commodity price
effects and producer costs for changes in production
management or conservation practices are small com-
pared with the improve performance scenario. Con-
sumers are largely unaffected, but taxpayers shoulder a
larger burden for farm income support than for the
improve performance scenario. Small price effects and
little change in production and conservation costs mean
that 1 dollar in producer payments translates roughly
into 1 dollar in increased farm income (fig. 11).
The choice of payment base also affects the regional
distribution of payments and farm income gains.
Regions with many “good actors” will receive a rela-
tively large share of payments from the good perform-
ance or good practices scenarios. In our empirical
examples, producers in the Heartland and Northern
Crescent regions reap relatively large gains in the good
performance and good practices scenarios (fig. 12).
Because price effects are small, payments translate
more or less directly into farm income gains in most
regions (fig. 13). Rice, soybean, and cotton prices
decline in the good practices scenario, leading to small
declines in farm income in the Fruitful Rim and Mis-
sissippi Portal regions (fig. 13). 
Payments in the improve performance scenario fall in
areas where environmental improvement is valuable
and/or can be achieved at low cost. In our empirical
example, payments for erosion reduction are largest
(relative to the baseline level of farm income) in the
Northern Crescent, Basin and Range, and Mississippi
Portal regions (fig. 12). Because price effects are sig-
nificant, however, farm income gains may be larger or
smaller than payments. Farm income gains are larger
than payments in the Heartland and Prairie Gateway
regions (fig. 13). In these regions, producers benefit
from increased grain prices, while making only mini-
mal investments in erosion reduction. Farm income
gains are smaller than payments (or even negative) in
the Northern Crescent, Northern Great Plains, Missis-
sippi Portal, and Fruitful Rim. In all four regions, sig-
nificant erosion reduction is achieved as land is
removed from crop production. Although per-acre pay-
ments tend to be high in these regions, land retirement
For the good performance scenarios, however, the tar-
geted scenario produces less erosion reduction and
slightly less water quality benefit per dollar of producer
payments over a wide range of program sizes. For exam-
ple, if producer payments in both scenarios are roughly
$2.1 billion, the targeted scenario produces $4.1 million
less in water quality benefits.
This result stems from the fact that erosion reduction is
not guaranteed in the good performance scenario. A sig-
nificant share of higher payments may simply go to
increase payments to “good actors,” and without safe-
guards, the good performance scenario will encourage
expansion of crop production. 
Regional results show how the cropland expansion effect
undercuts spatial targeting in the good performance sce-
nario. Targeting increases payments in five regions: the
Northern Crescent, Southern Seaboard, Mississippi Portal,
Fruitful Rim, and Eastern Uplands (see table). However,
water quality benefits improve in only two regions—the
Northern Crescent and Mississippi Portal—and actually
decline in the Southern Seaboard and Fruitful Rim regions.
Total cropland acreage expands (relative to the nontargeted
case) in four of the five regions where payments rise, off-
setting gains from adoption of low erosion systems on
existing cropland. The sodbuster provision, included in
both scenarios, affects only highly erodible land, leaving
producers free to expand production onto, and receive
agri-environmental payments on, other land. 
These results do not imply that “good actor” programs
cannot be successfully used to improve environmental
performance or cannot be targeted to increase environ-
mental benefits. However, program designs that induce
producers to increase cropland acreage – even on land
that is not highly erodible – can erase program-induced
environmental gains on existing cropland. A sodbuster
provision is critical, and policymakers may want to add
land-use safeguards similar to the “base acreage” (land
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is also an expensive erosion reduction strategy, so that
costs largely offset payments.
In summary, program outcomes—environmental
improvement and effects on agricultural producers, con-
sumers, and taxpayers—vary widely depending on the
details of program design. We find that no single pro-
gram design rises above others as an obvious choice
for agri-environmental policy. The improve performance
scenario appears to offer the most environmental
improvement per dollar of producer payments and pro-
vides the largest farm income boost per dollar of pay-
ment. However, baseline information needed to imple-
ment the improve performance payment base is not
available. Moreover, this approach could also be viewed
as inequitable by “good actors” and requires consumers
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The good performance and good practices payment
bases offer significant income support, do not
adversely affect consumers, and do not require pre-
program baseline information. While these payment
base options are realistic, they produce only modest
environmental gain and place a significant burden on
taxpayers. Program designers must be careful to mini-
mize incentives for cropland expansion. The good per-
formance payment base offers some advantages over
the good practices payment base in terms of directing
payments to environmentally effective actions and
allowing producers to select low-cost options where
there is more than one way to achieve an environmen-
tal outcome. On the other hand, the good practices
payment base is likely to require significantly less
planning and enforcement effort. Economic Research Service/USDA Agri-Environmental Policy at the Crossroads / AER-794  47
Summary and Conclusions
Changes in the agri-environmental landscape have
brought agri-environmental policy to a crossroads. In
the upcoming farm bill debate, policymakers face a
broadening array of agri-environmental problems.
While farm price and income support appears likely to
continue, the form this support will take is unknown.
Trade agreements may limit program options. Because
farm income and agri-environmental policies are inter-
twined (e.g., through compliance mechanisms), uncer-
tainty about farm income policy also creates uncer-
tainty about agri-environmental policy. This context
may signal an overall rethinking of agricultural policy,
including agri-environmental policy.
Agri-environmental policy—the collection of pro-
grams that encourage improved conservation and envi-
ronmental performance in agriculture—has evolved
significantly in recent years. Compliance mechanisms
have greatly increased consistency between farm com-
modity programs and environmental objectives, yield-
ing significant environmental gains. Environmental tar-
geting has increased environmental benefit in the CRP.
Cost-share programs have been largely consolidated
into EQIP, refocusing effort toward livestock opera-
tions and nutrient management. 
At present, agri-environmental policy employs a range
of policy instruments, including land retirement, cost-
share payments, and compliance mechanisms, which
affect both whether and how land is farmed. Still other
options are available. Agri-environmental payments—
subsidy programs that pay producers who achieve
good environmental performance or who use environ-
mentally sound practices—have been proposed by the
Clinton Administration and in Congress but have been
the subject of only limited formal analysis. Agri-envi-
ronmental payments may be useful in addressing
emerging agri-environmental issues and boosting 
farm income. 
In this report, we identified some tradeoffs that policy-
makers may face in the selection of objectives and the
design of an agri-environmental payments program.
Because the choices policymakers face are complex,
this report cannot provide a plan or “road map” for
future agri-environmental policy. It may, however, help
in reading the signs along the way.
A number of general lessons can be drawn from our
review of existing programs and empirical analysis of
a series of hypothetical program designs. First, in a
multi-objective policy, there is considerable risk of
conflict among potential objectives. Consistency
between farm income support and environmental
objectives has been enhanced through compliance
mechanisms. However, continued coordination among
all farm programs will be needed to minimize contra-
dictory or duplicative efforts. 
Second, performance-based payments may be advanta-
geous in that only environmentally relevant actions are
subsidized and producers have significant flexibility to
select low-cost alternatives. One-size-fits-all solutions
are unlikely to be successful in dealing with agri-envi-
ronmental problems. Soils, climatic conditions, crops,
and management practices vary widely across the
Nation. Practices that work well on one farm may be
environmentally ineffective or overly expensive on
another. Performance-based payments will (1) focus
activity on the subset of practices that are effective in a
given resource and production setting, and (2) reduce
producer participation costs by allowing them to select
least-cost alternatives. However, performance-based
payments may also involve high costs for planning and
enforcement because farm- or even field-specific plans
must be devised. Performance-based payments may
appear to be a less costly method of leveraging envi-
ronmental gains because they promote environmental
relevance and allow producer flexibility. However,
they may be more costly than practice-based payments
when planning and enforcement costs are considered. 
Third, spatial targeting can improve the cost-effective-
ness of an agri-environmental payments program, as
evidenced by the CRP. Benefit estimates can help poli-
cymakers identify those agri-environmental problems
that will yield the greatest net benefit to society. While
current environmental benefit estimates are not com-
plete, useful information is available. For example, the
benefits of reducing nitrogen runoff from agriculture
are likely to predominate in coastal estuaries, where
nitrogen is typically the nutrient causing eutrophica-
tion (Bricker et al., 1999). Farms near the coast or near
major rivers are more likely to contribute to coastal
nitrogen loads (Alexander et al., 1999). 
Finally, unintended incentives to expand crop produc-
tion can undermine program performance. Our empiri-
cal analysis suggests that agri-environmental payments
for good performance or good practices can encourage
expansion of crop production onto previously
uncropped land. In the absence of a sodbuster-type48  Agri-Environmental Policy at the Crossroads / AER-794 Economic Research Service/USDA
provision, this problem can be severe. Even with sod-
buster, cropland expansion can be a problem. Our
analysis suggests that the potential benefits of spatial
targeting can be undercut if high regional payment
rates, designed to encourage greater participation
where the value of environmental improvement is
high, also encourage cropland expansion. 
Agri-environmental policies can provide substantial
benefits to society. If policymakers choose to imple-
ment a program of agri-environmental payments, their
challenge will be to design one that achieves the great-
est possible benefit per dollar of cost to society.Economic Research Service/USDA Agri-Environmental Policy at the Crossroads / AER-794  49
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USDA Programs
Agricultural Conservation Program—Initiated in 1936,
ACP provided cost-sharing (up to $3,500 annually per
farmer) and technical assistance to farmers who carried
out approved conservation and environmental protection
practices on agricultural land and farmsteads. During
the past 20 years, outlays generally ran between $175
million and $200 million each year. The number of par-
ticipants gradually declined from more than 300,000
annually in the mid-1970’s to some 120,000 in the first
half of the 1990’s. Annual assistance per participant
averaged approximately $1,600 from 1990 to 1994.
Since the 1980s, an increasing amount and proportion
of cost-sharing was directed to water quality practices.
In 1994, 23 percent of ACP cost-sharing went for water
quality practices, up from 7 percent in 1988. Authority
for ACP terminated on October 1, 1996, when its func-
tions were subsumed by EQIP.
Conservation Compliance, Sodbuster, and Swamp-
buster—Enacted through the Food Security Act of
1985. Farmers remain eligible for programs such as
Commodity Credit Corporation price supports, CRP
payments, farm storage facility loans, disaster pay-
ments, Federal Crop Insurance, and FmHA loans when
they comply with measures of each. Conservation
compliance requires those who farm highly erodible
land (HEL) to implement a soil conservation plan.
Sodbuster requires that HEL not being cropped have a
conservation plan implemented if brought under pro-
duction. Swampbuster requires farmers not to drain
any wetland. All three provide water quality benefits,
however, swampbuster also maintains wetland habitat.
Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program—CREP,
authorized in the 1996 Farm Act and operated by FSA,
is a State-Federal conservation partnership program
targeted to address specific State and nationally signif-
icant water quality, soil erosion, and wildlife habitat
issues related to agriculture. The program offers addi-
tional financial incentives beyond the CRP to encour-
age farmers and ranchers to enroll in 10-15 year con-
tracts to retire land from production. CREP is funded
through CCC.
Conservation Reserve Program—was initiated by
Congress in Title XII of the Food Security Act of
1985, was extended by the Food, Agriculture, Conser-
vation and Trade Act of 1990, and has been extended
to 2002 by the Federal Agriculture Improvement and
Reform Act of 1996. The CRP is a voluntary cropland
retirement program with a maximum enrollment of
36.4 million acres. The program provides farmers an
annual rental payment on land enrolled in a 10-15 year
contract. Land is placed in a permanent cover. Parcels
are selected based on the magnitude of the likely envi-
ronmental gain relative to the rental payment. Environ-
mental gains include habitat improvements, water
quality impacts, soil productivity gains, air quality
improvements, and carbon sequestration.
Conservation Technical Assistance—Since 1936, CTA,
has provided technical assistance to farmers for plan-
ning and implementing soil and water conservation
and water quality practices. Both farmers adopting
practices under USDA conservation programs and
other producers who ask for assistance in adopting
approved NRCS practices can receive technical assis-
tance. In recent years, CTA has prepared conservation
plans for highly erodible lands to help farmers main-
tain eligibility for USDA program benefits.
Emergency Wetlands Reserve Program—The EWRP
was established in 1993, using funds from the Emer-
gency Watershed Protection Program authorized under
emergency supplemental appropriations after the Mid-
west flood. The voluntary program helped landowners
convert flood-damaged cropland to wetlands if the cost
of the levee restoration and cropland renovation
exceeded the value of the land. Approximately 89,500
acres have been enrolled in the EWRP through 1997
(Heimlich et al., 1998). 
Environmental Quality Incentives Program—EQIP was
established by the 1996 Farm Act to consolidate and
better target the functions of the ACP, WQIP, GPCP,
and Colorado River Basin Salinity Program. The objec-
tive of EQIP, like its predecessor programs, is to
encourage farmers and ranchers to adopt practices that
reduce environmental and resource problems by pro-
viding education, technical assistance, and financial
assistance, targeted to watersheds, regions, or areas of
special environmental sensitivity identified as priority
areas. Contracts are for 5 to 10 years, and the annual
payment limit is $10,000 per person, with a maximum
of $50,000 per contract. In 1997, 56 percent of EQIP
funds were allocated to water quality concerns, 23 per-
cent to soil erosion, 11 percent to water quantity, and 4
percent to wildlife habitat (USDA, NRCS, 1998). EQIP
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is designed to consider all sources of conservation
funding from CRP, WRP, other Federal programs, State
or local programs, and nongovernmental partners. Pro-
posed projects with greater funding from these sources
receive more favorable scoring for EQIP funding. 
Wildlife Habitat Incentives Program—The WHIP was
created in 1996 to provide cost-sharing assistance to
landowners for developing habitat for upland and wet-
land wildlife, threatened and endangered species, fish,
and other types of wildlife. Participating landowners,
with the assistance of the NRCS district office,
develop plans that include schedules for installing
wildlife habitat development practices and require-
ments for maintaining the habitat for the 5- or 10-year
life of the agreement. Cost-share payments of up to
75 percent may be used to establish new practices,
maintain or replace practices needed to meet the
objectives of the program, and replace practices that
fail for reasons beyond the landowner’s control.
Cooperating State wildlife agencies and nonprofit or
private organizations may provide expertise or addi-
tional funding to help complete a project. About 90
percent of projects approved are for improvements to
upland habitat, with the balance in riparian area, wet-
land, and aquatic improvements. 
Water Quality Incentive Projects—The WQIP was cre-
ated by the 1990 Food, Agriculture, Conservation and
Trade Act, and was administered as an ACP practice.
The goal of WQIP was to reduce agricultural pollu-
tants through sound farm management practices that
restore or enhance water resources compromised by
agricultural nonpoint source pollution. Areas eligible
for WQIP included: watersheds identified by States as
being impaired by nonpoint source pollution under
Section 319 of the Clean Water Act; areas identified by
State agencies for environmental protection and so
designated by the Governor; and areas where sinkholes
conveyed runoff directly into ground water. A total of
242 projects were started during FY 1993-95. Eligible
producers entered into 3- to 5-year agreements with
USDA to implement approved management practices
on their farms, as part of an overall water quality plan,
in return for an incentive payment. In 1995, WQIP
assistance was applied to over 800,000 acres. EQIP
was consolidated into EQIP by the 1996 Farm Act.
Wetlands Reserve Program—Authorized by the Food,
Agriculture, Conservation and Trade Act of 1990, the
WRP provides an easement payment and covers wet-
land restoration costs for land permanently converted
back to a wetland. As of July 2000, a total of 5,230
contracts had been accepted and over 915,000 acres
enrolled (USDA, NRCS, 2000d). The WRP is prima-
rily a habitat protection program but also serves as a
water purification system.
Federal Programs Outside of USDA 
Coastal Zone Act Reauthorization Amendments—
CZARA, of 1990, added important nonpoint source
water pollution requirements to the Coastal Zone Man-
agement Act. This is the first federally mandated pro-
gram requiring specific measures to deal with agricul-
tural nonpoint sources. CZARA requires that each of
the 29 States and territories with an approved coastal
zone management program submit to EPA and to the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration a
program to “implement management measures for
nonpoint source pollution to restore and protect coastal
waters” (U.S. EPA, 1996). States can utilize voluntary
incentives to get farmers to adopt economically
achievable measures for controlling agricultural NPS
pollution (education, technical assistance, and financial
assistance) but must enforce adoption if voluntary
approaches fail. Implementation of plans is not
required to begin until 2004. In general, annual costs
of CZARA management measures are estimated to be
less than $5,000 per farm for most farm sizes (Heim-
lich and Barnard, 1995).
Endangered Species Act—The ESA of 1973 is the
Nation's chief statute to conserve endangered or threat-
ened species and their ecosystems. Farmers may not
"take" a member of a species determined to be in dan-
ger of extinction. ("Take" is defined within the ESA as
"to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, kill, trap, cap-
ture, or collect" an endangered or threatened species or
attempt to do so.) In some cases, habitat destruction
might be prohibited under the ESA, or cropping prac-
tices or pesticide use may be restricted (Daugherty,
1997).  More likely, farmers will be affected to the
extent that they require a Federal permit (e.g., for fill-
ing wetlands) or depend on the use of Federal
resources (e.g., irrigation water supplied by the Bureau
of Reclamation or public grazing lands) because the
agencies providing those services may be restricted
from doing so by the act's requirement that Federal
agencies help restore listed species. 
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act—
FIFRA of 1947 provides the legal basis under which
pesticides are regulated. A pesticide can be restrictedEconomic Research Service/USDA Agri-Environmental Policy at the Crossroads / AER-794  59
or banned if it poses unacceptable risks to human
health or the environment. The re-registration process,
mandated in 1988 for all active ingredients then on the
market, has resulted in manufacturers’ dropping many
less profitable products rather than paying the registra-
tion fees.
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments
(Clean Water Act)—Enacted in 1972, the CWA has
focused on reducing water quality impacts of point
sources of pollution (factory discharge and municipal
sewage). In recent years, attention has turned to non-
point sources, primarily runoff from agricultural oper-
ations, and to an agricultural point source—confined
animal feedlot operations (CAFO’s). Currently, over
6,000 livestock operations are large enough to be clas-
sified as CAFO’s under the Clean Water Act (EPA and
USDA, 1998). The Clean Water Act requires that
CAFO’s obtain a permit to discharge. However,
enforcement has been a problem, and many facilities
lack permits (Westenbarger and Letson, 1995). To
address nonpoint sources, EPA and USDA jointly
developed a Clean Water Action Plan (CWAP), as
requested by the White House. The initiatives of the
CWAP, released in 1998, will bring better interagency
coordination and cooperation to better farmers’ efforts
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Environmental and economic effects of various green
payment program scenarios are derived as compara-
tive static changes in the U.S. Regional Agricultural
Sector Model (USMP). An agriculture sector spatial
equilibrium model as described in McCarl and
Spreen, USMP incorporates agricultural commodity
supply, use, and policy measures (House). USMP has
been applied to project the effects on U.S. national
and regional agriculture of changes in export levels
and variability (Miller et al.), trade agreements (Bur-
fisher et al.), imports (Spinelli et al.), input taxes
(Peters et al.), irrigation policy (Horner et al.), ethanol
production (House et al.), wetlands policy (Heimlich
et al., 1997a, Claassen et al., 1998), sustainable agri-
culture policy (Faeth), and various other policy and
program scenarios.
USMP models production of 10 crops: corn, sorghum,
oats, barley, wheat, rice, cotton, soybeans, hay, and
silage. Sixteen primary livestock production enterprises
are included, the principal being dairy, swine, beef cat-
tle, and poultry. Coefficients in crop and livestock enter-
prise budgets were developed from USDA National
Resources Inventory (NRI), Cropping Practices Survey
(CPS), and Farm Costs and Returns Survey (FCRS)
data. CPS and FCRS data are collected and analyzed by
the Economic Research Service and National Agricul-
tural Statistics Service of the U.S. Department of Agri-
culture. Several dozen processed and retail products are
included in the model structure, the principal being
dairy products, pork, fed and nonfed beef, poultry, soy
meal and oil, livestock feeds, and corn milling products.
Acreage, commodity supply/use, conservation reserve
program acreage, prices, production practices, and so
forth are validated exactly to USDA baseline projections
for 2005 (USDA-WAOB) and corresponding geographic
information. For example, USMP’s base U.S. corn
acreage planted in 2005 equals the USDA baseline pro-
jection and corn acreage in each model region/practice
stratum is determined by share information from NRI
and CPS regional data. On the demand side, domestic
use, exports, ending stocks, and price levels for crop
and livestock commodities and most processed or retail
products are endogenously determined within the model
structure with domestic consumption, commercial stock,
export and other demand functions specified with elas-
ticities from the FAPSIM econometric simulation model
(Green and Price).
USMP models 45 regions and two soils within each
region (highly erodible and non-highly erodible soil).
For analysis of green payments, the primary strength
of USMP lies in the specification of multiple combina-
tions of crop rotations and production practices for
each soil in each region. For example, in response to
incentives for soil erosion reduction, producers may
switch to rotations that include less erosive crops or
increase residue cover through adoption of conserva-
tion tillage methods.
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Environmental indicators are linked spatially to farm-
level economic data from ARMS. Environmental indi-
cator values are averaged over space and assigned to
counties using a geographic information system.
ARMS data points located in a given county are asso-
ciated to these average environmental indicators
assigned to the county. This spatial association is valid
to the extent that spatial variations in land resources
and farms (e.g., variation in acreage, sales, crops, pro-
duction practices) are interrelated. The development of
ERS farm resource regions (the level at which results
of our ARMS-environmental indicator link are
reported) supports this assumption. Regions are based
on relatively uniform farms and land resources, based
on a cluster analysis of U.S. farm characteristics (Som-
mer and Hines, 1991), old USDA farm production
regions, USDA land resource regions (USDA-SCS,
1981), and NASS crop reporting districts.
The distribution of farms by financial and income
characteristics—used to define income support target
groups and the ERS typology—is derived from data
collected through USDA’s Agricultural Resource Man-
agement Survey (ARMS) data. The ARMS is designed
to capture the physical, financial, demographic, and
managerial attributes of farm businesses and people
engaged in farming. The survey is conducted annually
by the Economic Research Service (ERS) and the
National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS). 
Environmental indicator acreages for rainfall and wind
erosion were estimated from the National Resource
Inventory (NRI) point data files. NRI point data files
are collected and maintained by the Natural Resources
Conservation Service (NRCS) of the U.S. Department
of Agriculture (USDA) and contain detailed data on
land use and condition, including estimates of rainfall
and wind erosion, for each of more than 800,000
points nationwide. High-nitrogen-runoff acreage is
estimated as cropland acreage in areas estimated by
the SPARROW model (Smith et al., 1997) to have
nitrogen yields (runoff per unit area of land) from
commercial fertilizer application in excess of 1,000
kg/km2/year. 
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Small Family Farms (sales less than $250,000)*
Limited-resource. Any small farm with gross sales
less than $100,000, total farm assets less than
$150,000, and total operator household income less
than $20,000. Limited-resource farmers may report
farming, a nonfarm occupation, or retirement as
their major occupation.
Retirement. Small farms whose operators report they
are retired (excludes limited-resource farms oper-
ated by retired farmers).
Residential/lifestyle. Small farms whose operators
report a major occupation other than farming
(excludes limited-resource farms with operators
reporting a nonfarm major occupation).
Farming occupation, lower-sales. Small farms with
sales less than $100,000 whose operators report
farming as their major occupation (excludes limited-
resource farms whose operators report farming as
their major occupation).
Farming occupation, higher-sales. Small farms with
sales between $100,000 and $249,999 whose opera-
tors report farming as their major occupation.
Other Farms
Large family farms. Farms with sales between
$250,000 and $499,999.
Very large family farms. Farms with sales of
$500,000 or more.
Nonfamily farms. Farms organized as nonfamily cor-
porations or cooperatives, as well as farms operated
by hired managers.
*The National Commission on Small Farms suggested the
$250,000 cutoff for small farms.
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Agriculture affects a wide variety of environmental
resources including water, wildlife, and clean air,
which, in turn, are important in producing a wide vari-
ety of environmental amenities or nonmarket goods
and services including clean water for recreation, bet-
ter bird watching, and healthy air to breath. People
value improvements in environmental amenities. 
It has long been understood that markets are not able
to fully link those who supply improvements (in this
case, the farmers) with those who benefit from the
increase in amenities. Thus, without public action,
individuals do not experience the level of environmen-
tal quality they would otherwise purchase. 
What is the appropriate level of public action? One
way to answer this question is to estimate the value
that the public places on a change in the amenities and
compare them with the associated costs of their provi-
sion through an agri-environmental program—much
the same way consumers trade off costs and benefits. 
In order to value changes in agricultural land use for
policy analyses, both physical and economic relation-
ships must be estimated. The fundamental steps
involved in estimating the relationships relevant to
valuing sediment and nitrogen impacts are:
1. the value the public places on an improvement in an
environmental amenity;
example: the value visitors place on a 10 percent
increase in the clarity of beach water in August;
2. the change in the amenity associated with a change
in sediment or nitrogen in the water;
example: the change in clarity resulting from a 15
percent change in the water’s sediment loading;
3. the change in sediment or nitrogen in the water due
to a change in erosion or excess nitrogen on the
field;
example: the change in sediment loadings at a beach
due to a 17 percent change in field erosion;
4. the change in erosion or excess nitrogen due to a
change in agricultural practices;
example: the change in field erosion due to adopting
contour tillage by all corn producers of the relevant
watershed(s).
Included in Step 3 is the fate-and-transport process
when environmental impacts are not local. For exam-
ple, nitrogen has its greatest impact on environmental
amenities when it reaches coastal waters, especially
estuarial zones (Bricker et al., 1999). Soil sediment
impacts on shipping tend to be at downstream ports
(Davis et al., 2000).
Details on how these relationships were estimated fol-
low. While the focus is on valuing impacts of sediment
and nitrogen, the reasoning applied in these cases is
applicable to valuing other environmental amenities.
While the best available data and information are used,
many uncertainties remain. However, the proposed
measures are structured so that additional data and infor-
mation can be incorporated, as they become available. 
Sediment. The values the public places on reductions
in soil erosion have been estimated for the following
environmental amenities: municipal water use, indus-
trial uses, irrigation ditch maintenance, road ditch
maintenance, water storage, flooding, and soil produc-
tivity (Ribaudo et al., 1990; Ribaudo, 1986), freshwa-
ter-based recreation (Feather et al., 1999), and naviga-
tion (Davis et al., 2000). These are not all of the envi-
ronmental amenities affected by sediment. Amenities
not included are: increases in waterfowl populations,
cleaner coastal and estuarine recreation areas, popula-
tion survival of endangered species, and quality of
commercial fisheries. Therefore, the value used here
should be viewed as a minimum estimate.
These studies have, directly or indirectly, attempted to
account for steps 2 and 3—amenity response to sedi-
ment and the fate-and-transport process. All have
relied on the USLE (Universal Soil-Loss Equation) to
determine the current level of soil erosion within a
watershed. Each then either uses this measure of ero-
sion as a water-quality indicator or as a link to changes
in water quality. For example, Feather et al. (1999)
estimated recreational behavior based on (among other
things) geographic variation in erosion within water-
sheds as given by the USLE. Davis et al. (2000) esti-
mated cost as a function of total upstream erosion, as
measured by the USLE. Ribaudo used a slightly differ-
ent approach. His models estimate values based on
water quality but then linked changes in water quality
to changes in erosion, as measured by the USLE. 
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Finally, changes in erosion following any change in
farmland use (step 4) are commonly measured using
the USLE. With this tool, the field-level measures of
soil erosion changes can be derived from field-level
data detailing changes in farmland use. 
Annual values of a 1-ton reduction in soil erosion will
differ across fields in the country because both the phys-
ical impacts on amenities and economic values of
changes in the amenities vary (fig. 9, p. 34). This varia-
tion in the field-level value of a reduction in soil erosion
emphasizes the advantages of environmental targeting.
Nitrogen. The value the public places on a reduction of
nitrogen to estuaries includes impacts on boating, swim-
ming, and recreational fishing (Hellerstein and Brene-
man, 2000). These are not all of the activities affected
by the water quality impacts of nitrogen. Research has
focused on these activities because they appear to be
especially significant (Bockstael et al., 1986). However,
other impacts, such as impacts to bird watchers, water
views, and commercial fisheries, are also likely to be
significant. Experts are still studying the impacts of
nitrogen in our waters. For example, nitrogen’s impact
on the 5,000-7,000 square mile zone of hypoxia in the
northern Gulf of Mexico may be having significant
impacts on environmental amenities. Hypoxia is a defi-
ciency in breathable oxygen (< 2.0 mg/l of dissolved
oxygen) sufficient to cause damage to living tissue and
death. While the link between hypoxia in the northern
Gulf and nitrogen loadings from the Mississippi River is
recognized (Rabalais et al., 1996), the impact of
hypoxia on wildlife, and thus the need for concern, con-
tinues to be debated. Nitrogen inflows to the Chesa-
peake Bay and other bays and coastal areas may also be
affecting environmental amenities. If nitrogen does have
high-valued impacts in these areas, then the nitrogen
amenity value employed here is biased downward in the
associated watersheds.
As in the studies that valued changes in sediment
impacts on amenities, an indirect measure of the
amenity was used. In this case, studies assumed that the
change in amenities in an estuary is proportional to the
change in nitrogen delivered to the estuary—an indirect
approach to estimating fate and transport relationships.
The link between field-level nitrogen and nitrogen
inflow to each estuary is estimated in two steps. In the
first step, the USGS SPARROW (SPAtially Referenced
Regressions On Watershed Attributes) model (Smith et
al., 1997) provides nitrogen delivery ratios between a
stream’s edge and the estuary for all watersheds. This
‘water-based’ delivery ratio accounts for nitrogen loss
as it moves downstream. The delivery ratio for a
watershed is the fraction of a pound of nitrogen that
will make it from the stream’s edge to the estuary. As a
geographic foundation, the SPARROW model uses the
2,112 eight-digit hydrologic cataloging units (HUCs)
or watersheds representative of the 48 States. The
model is based on empirical evidence that stream
depth is a critical factor in preventing nitrogen absorp-
tion by the environment. Thus the proximity of agri-
cultural land to major rivers and streams is a critical
determinant of the portion of nitrogen that reaches the
estuary (Alexander et al., 2000; Smith et al., 2000). 
The second step in linking field-level nitrogen to estuary
nitrogen accounts for the fate-and-transport of nitrogen
from the field to the stream’s edge for each estuary. This
delivery ratio accounts for nitrogen losses as nitrogen
moves from the field to the water (Hellerstein and Bren-
eman). This “field-to-stream” delivery ratio is approxi-
mated by dividing the pounds of agricultural nitrogen
reaching a stream’s edge by the pounds of the excess
nitrogen (nitrogen not absorbed by the crop) associated
with crop production within each watershed. Stream-
edge (agricultural) nitrogen for each HUC comes from
the USGS SPARROW model. Field-level, excess nitro-
gen estimates come from the EPIC model (USDA,
ARS, 1990). The product of the field-to-stream and
stream-to-estuary delivery ratios for each watershed pro-
duces a “field-to-estuary” delivery ratio for each water-
shed. The field-to-estuary delivery ratio estimates the
portion of a pound of excess nitrogen on a field within a
watershed that is likely to reach the downstream estuary.
Variations in the stream-to-estuary delivery ratios, along
with variations across estuaries in the value of the envi-
ronmental impact of a pound of nitrogen, result in varia-
tions in the field-level value of a pound of excess nitro-
gen (fig. 10, p. 35). This variation in the field-level val-
ues also illustrates the advantages of environmental tar-
geting for control of excess agricultural nitrogen.
With changes in nitrogen application rates, cropping
mix, tillage practice, etc., will come changes in excess
nitrogen. The EPIC model is able to estimate the
change in excess nitrogen based on changes in agricul-
tural practices that follow a change in agricultural pol-
icy. The EPIC model also accounts for other losses of
nitrogen (e.g., the atmosphere) and thus provides an
estimate of nitrogen in water reaching the field’s edge
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The U.S. farm sector is highly diverse. Farms vary
widely in terms of resource base, products produced,
production practices, and financial performance. The
Economic Research Service (ERS) developed the nine
new farm resource regions to more accurately depict
geographic variation and facilitate the reporting and
interpretation of farm sector data and research results. 
County clusters, based on the types of commodities pro-
duced, have shown that a few commodities tend to dom-
inate farm production in specific geographic areas that
cut across State boundaries. The climate, soil, water,
and topography in these geographic areas tend to deter-
mine the dominant crop and livestock enterprises. In
developing the new regions, ERS recognized the limita-
tions of using State boundaries and that new informa-
tion technology makes finer resolution practical.
The new ERS regions are derived from four sources:
(1) the Farm Production Regions—Corn Belt, North-
ern Plains, etc., (2) a cluster analysis of U.S. farm
characteristics (Sommer and Hines, 1991), (3) the
USDA Land Resource Regions, and the National Agri-
cultural Statistics Service’s (NASS) Crop Reporting
Districts. The ERS regions were constructed by identi-
fying areas where similar farm types (in terms of com-
modity production) intersected with areas of similar
physiographic, soil, and climatic traits, as reflected in
USDA’s Land Resource Regions. Final boundaries
were drawn to conform with NASS Crop Reporting
Districts, which are aggregates of counties. 
The farm resource regions are no longer constrained to
follow State boundaries and are not necessarily con-
tiguous. Contiguous areas within single States are
Appendix 6: ERS Farm Resource Regions
Basin and Range Northern Great Plains Heartland Northern Crescent
Fruitful Rim Eastern Uplands Prairie Gateway Mississippi Portal Southern Seaboard
Largest share of nonfamily
farms, smallest share of U.S.
cropland.
4% of farms, 4% of value of
production, 4% of cropland.
Cattle, wheat, and sorghum
farms.
Largest share of large and
very large family farms and
nonfamily farms.
10% of farms, 22% of value of
production, 8% of cropland.
Fruit, vegetable, nursery, and
cotton farms.
Largest farms and smallest population.
5% of farms, 6% of value of production,
17% of cropland.
Wheat, cattle, and sheep farms.
Most farms (22%), highest value
of production, (23%), and most
cropland (27%).
Cash grain and cattle farms.
Most populous region.
15% of farms, 15% of value of
production, 9% of cropland.
Dairy, general crop, and cash
grain farms.
Second in wheat, oat, barley,
rice, and cotton production.
13% of farms, 12% of value
of production, 17% of crop-
land.
Cattle, wheat, sorghum, 
cotton, and rice farms.
Higher proportions of both
small and larger farms than
elsewhere.
5% of farms, 4% of value of
production, 5% of cropland.
Cotton, rice, poultry, and
hog farms.
Mix of small and larger farms.
11% of farms, 9% of value of
production, 6% of cropland.
Part-time cattle, general field
crop, and poultry farms.
Most small farms of any
region.
15% of farms, 5% of
value of production, and
6% of cropland.
Part-time cattle, tobacco,
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sometimes split up among multiple regions. For exam-
ple, farms in the old Appalachian region (Tennessee,
Kentucky, North Carolina and Virginia) vary widely in
topography, soil, and commodities produced. In the
new ERS farm resource regions, these four States are
split among four different regions: the Heartland, Mis-
sissippi Portal, Eastern Uplands, and Southern
Seaboard. Three regions—the Eastern Uplands, Fruit-
ful Rim, and Southern Seaboard—are discontiguous.
The Fruitful Rim, which covers parts of nine States
from Florida to Washington, is an extreme example of
the spatial separation that can exist between farms that
produce similar commodities under similar conditions.Economic Research Service/USDA Agri-Environmental Policy at the Crossroads / AER-794  67